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A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE RESOURCES
OF THE SEABED AND SUBSOIL OF THE DEEP SEA:
A BREWING PROBLEM FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKERS
Horace B. Robertson, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
In the Fall of 1967, in the TwcntySe('orlll Session of the UniLcd NaLions
(;cneral Assembly, the l{epresentaLive
of :\lalLa introduced a Hcsolution which
called UpOIl the General Asscmbly to
take up a trealy whit'h would reservc
tlw d('ep ocean hed and iLs rcsourees to
Lhc lInited Nations to he exploited for
the hcnefit of thc underdcveloped COIIIltril's. This Hl':;olulioll was placed on the
agl'llIla 111111 wa:< (It-batt'd in COJllmittet' I
ancl in LII(: :\sscmbly, ,\Ithough the
(;ml!'ral AS:<I'JJ1hly Ilid not appro\'e Lhl~
Ih-soluLion per S(' huL int'tead creaLed an
.. td /Joe CommiLLee to sLudy all aspects

of the matter and to report to the
Twcnty-Third Session, the fact that it
was even brought forward at that time
carne as a surprisc to many.
Thc emergence of the seabed of the
deep ocean as a problem for international decision makers was sudden and
dramatic. Less than 10 years earlier a
United Nations Conference on thc Law
of the Sea had considered the problem
remoLe, Even today man's activities on
Lhe floor of the deep ocean are miniscule, and the eOllllllercial exploitation
of the resoun:cs of the seabl:cI and
suhsoillll'yollcl LII!' eontiJl(:IlL.t1 shl-If still
rcmains f~r thc fuLure. Why, Lhell, has
the legal sLatus of the deep ocean bed
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become of such international concern
that it is discussed today within the
United Nations? Is the problem of such
urgency that it merits such attention? If
so, what is the framework within which
solutions may be found?
It is the purpose of this paper to
explore these and related questions. The
approach to the problem will be, first,
to examine the technological developments of the last few years, and those
promised for the next few, which have
catapulted the issue to prominence.
Then, after an examination of the current status of the law of the sea,
particularly as to its applicability to
activities on the deep ocean floor, the
paper will examine the types of seabed
activIties which are projected for the
future in order to establish a Lasis for
determining the elements of a possible
regime for the deep ocean bed and
subsoil. This will be followed by an
examination of several alternative
regimes which might have applicability
to the seabed as well as possible procedural and political methods by which
a regime might be brought into beinl!.
The interaction betwecn the political,
lcgal and technological factors will forlll
the basis for tentative conclusions, with
particular em phasi? on the courses of
action open to the United States in
shaping a regime which would bc favorable to United States interests.
I--THE PROBLEM EMERGES
Recent Expeetations on Exploitability of the Deep Ocean Floor. In
January 1958, in a paper prepared by
the Secretariat of the United Nations as
a preparatory study for the 1958 United
Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, it was stated that it was probable
that oil exploitation of the continental
shclf would ultimately be conducted in
waters as deep as :WO metcrs) Th('
papl'r prl'dictl·tl that \IIHler~ea tl'dllIolog), might advance rapidly enough tu
permit such exploitation to occur in as

short a tillle as 20 years. With respect to
the resources of the deep ocean hed, the
paper was more pessimistic. It stated:
In view of a certain fear of an ever
outwards-moving boundary line of the
legal 'continental shelf' an inquiry was
also made into the question whether
the ocean floor contains any exploitable minerals. The answers indicate
that the sediment carpet covering most
parts of the ocean floor does not
contain minerals in any concentrations
worthwhile exploiting.
In one plate manganese ore has been
found, but since this is availablc on
land in sufficient quantity, exploita.
tion from the ocean bottom is not
necessary and would not pay. The
sediment carpet, being extremely thick
will in most places make cxploitation
of laycrs undcmeath impossiblc. In the
fcw places where the sediment is thin.
ncr or non·existent formations may he
found with the prospect of exploita.
tion. Intrusions, such as the l'I1idAtlantic Ridge, might have mineral
deposits associated with them. The
depth will. however. be an insurmountable obstacle for exploitation for a
long time to come. quite apart from
the eommcrcial prospects which seem
non-existent.2
The l'onclusions in the papcr rl'flected the consensus of scientific and
technical thought at that tilllc and scrve
partly to explain the complete absence
of eonsidcrlltion hy the 19;;B COIIference on thc Law uf thc Sea of till!
legal status of the seabed and subsoil of
the sea beyond the Continental Shelf.3
But. like so many estimates and predictions in this age of rapid teclmological
advance, the eonclusions in that paper
and those of the scientists and technologists upon whom it relied have proved
conservative, and today, only 10 years
after they were mude, techno\0I!Y hut'
already outstripped the developmcnts
predicted for 1978 or later,
Current Capabilities and Predictions
of the Future. In 19(16. IJ/lS;'I(,.~S J/'l'l'k
n'IHlrll'd.lhal lIumhh' Oil and Hc'fillin~
Company had u:;c'd a remoll',oIH'ralecl
drilling vessel to install a wcllhcucl at a
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632·foot (192 meter) depth off the
California coast near Santa Barbara. 4
That was a record at that time, but hy
October 1967, Global Marine, Inc., the
commercial ocean drilling firm which
sank the 632·foot well, was operating
three commercial ocean drilling vessels
capable of drilling oil wells to a depth of
25,000 feet in water depths of 1,000
feet (305 meters) and was reported
about to put two additional vessels with
similar capabilities into operation within
a year. 5
In the field of exploration and scien·
tific research, in 1967 the National
Science Foundation awarded -a contract
for obtaining ocean bottom cores up to
2,500 feet long in water depths of 5,000
to 20,000 feet. 6
Prohahly the development that has
stimulated the most interest in the
possibility of fommercial exploitation
of the resources of the deep ocean bed
is the discovery within recent years that
vast areas of the ocean bottom are
literally "paved" with manganese nod·
ules. These nodules are mineral lumps
found lying on the bottom of the ocean.
Although their composition varies from
location to location, they usually con·
sist primarily of manganese, iron, nickel,
cobalt and copper. Their origin is not
fully understood, but it is generally
helieved that they result from the col·
lection of colloidal particles of the
various elements as they filter down
through the water, the colloids of man·
ganese and iron attracting those of
nickel, copper, cobalt and the other
metals. 7 Dr. John L. Mero, a leading
expert on the techniques of undersea
exploration and mining, has made a
detailed study of the economic aspects
of m!ning these nodules commercially
using simple drag dredge techniques and
has concluded that in depths of water
up to about 5,000 feet the venture
would ll(~ profilahlt,.B III Aup;lIst JI)(,7
IIII' NI'wporl NI'ws ShiplJllil,lillp; allli
I lryclock Company was awarded a
patent 011 a vessel designed espccially

for mining manganese noclules. 9
But the known resources of the deep
seabed are not limited to manganese
nodules. Phosphorite, a valuable plant
nutrient, is also found in nodules on the
seabed in many areas of the ocean,
generally in depths of 600 feet to 5,000
feel. IO One abortive attempt has al·
ready been made to mine a rich area a
few miles off the California coast under
U.S. Department of Interior license, but
after extended exploration and trial
dredging by the licensee, the allempt
was abandoned hecause it was dis·
covered that the bottom in this particu,
lar area was also sprinkled with thou·
sands of torpedo and naval gun shells
left as an aftermath of decades of use as
a Navy target range.! I Dr. Mero has also
made detailed studies of the composi.
tion of the "oozes" which make up the
sediment covering the majority of the
ocean bottom, and has determined that,
far from being worthless, they could
provide an inexhaustible and commer·
cially exploitable source of calcium
carbonate as a substitute for lime·
stolle.! 2
Despite thesl~ heady pr!'llil'lio11l; of
things to come, it is nevertheless impor.
tant to recognize that up to the present
time, the only undersea mining that has
bcen done commercially is limited to
areas that arc fairly close illslu)('(! and
are geologically a part of the continental
shclf. As a prominent mining engineer
stated at a recent institute:
•.. I represent a group of practical
mining people now engaged in under·
sca mining around the world for a
number of different minerals and in a
number of ways. As a matter of fact,
after hearing the scssion at the Marine
Technology Society the other day, we
made the calculation that if only
people who were experienced in the
ocean talked at such meetings and they
only t;tlked about things they had
adually dOIl(" illslt'ad of ahoul what
Ih!'y prupo",~ 10 clo, it woulcl ('ul a
Ihn'(' day IIlt'diug clown 10 ahoul ;11\
hour and fifteen minules. There is a lot
of rather wild speculation about under·
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sea mining, but thcrc is somc actually
going on in thc worId. 13

Uncertain Status of the Resources of
the Deep Seabed. The promise of riches
from the sea and the predictions of
rapid technological progress toward
achieving commercial exploitation of
them at ever greater depths have caused
increased attention to be focused on the
Icgal status of the seabed and subsoil of
thc oceans beyond the continental shelf
and on the mineral resources that may
be extracted. Within the United Statcs
the most prominent individual who has
sought to attract attention to the problem has been Senator Claiborne Pell of
Rhode Island. In a book published in
1966 he stated:
Because technology has not yet
reached the stage of developmcnt whcn
deep-sea mining is feasible, questions
of who owns the decp sea floor have
not been stud\cd seriously. But technology will develop quickly, and for
some minerals in short supply deep-sea
mining may be worthwhile very soon.
Is the deep-sea mineral wealth to be
taken by the first comer? It seems
likely, at least now. If a deep-sea
petroleum rig strikes oil at a mile
dcpth, can the rigs of othcr nations sct
up alongside and drill into thc samc
poor? Such questions will not bc academic for long.14

At thc prescnt time thcre is no
answer to Scnator PeWs acadcmic questions. The 1958 Conference on the Law
of the Sea adopted a Convention on the
Continental Shelf which establishes the
"sovereign rights" of the coastal state
over the adjacent continental shelf for
the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.l 5 The
Convention defines the shelf as that area
of the adja,cent submarine area to a
depth of 200 meters or " ... beyond
that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources. "16
Beyond thc limi ts of thc contincntal
shelf thcrc is no acccpted lcgal rcgimc,
and, in fact, only recently havc legal
scholars hegun to think seriously about

the problem.
Proposals for a Legal Regime. Within
the United States, Senator Claiborne
Pell has been in the forefront in proposing clarification of the regime of the
deep seabed. On 29 September 1967 he
introduced a Senate Resolution calling
for the United States to take the initiative in obtaining an international agreement which would declare that the floor
of the deep sea and the resources of the
seabed and subsoil thereof, beyond the
limits of the continental shelf, should be
free for exploration and exploitation of
all nations and incapable of coming
under the sovereignty of anyone nation
or group of nations. The Resolution also
called for appropriate arms control
measures for the deep ocean and for the
calling of a conference for setting the
outer boundaries of the continental
shelf of each nation.l 7 On 5 March
1968 he introduced a second resolution
which submitted a draft of a proposed
Ocean Space Treaty.l8
Within the United States, at least two
other influential groups have made similar suggcstions. In 1965 thc Commi tlec
on Conservation and Dcvclopmcnt of
Natural Resourccs of the White l\OIlSC
Conference on International Cooperation proposc!1 thc estahlishnwnL of II
:;peciali;-.cd agcncy of tIll: 1Il1ill~d NIItions similar to those established for
atomic energy and civil aviation which
would have the responsibility of leasing
mineral rights in the sea bottom and for
promoting the development of these
resources. 19 In its 17th Report in 1966
the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (the Research Affiliate of
the United Nations Association of the
United States of America) urged that
the General Assembly should declare
that no nation may appropriate the
seabed beyond the continental shclf and
rceommclilled thilt tlw (;mll'ml Assembly set III' :I spl~cial agency, III hll
known as the United Nations l\'larine
Resources Agency, to control and ad-
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minisLer inLernaLional marine resources;
hold ownership rights; and grant, lease
or use them in accordance with the
principles of economic efficiency.20
On the international scene, the
Geneva World Peace Through Law Conference of 1967 passed a resolution on
13 July 1967, recommending that the
General Assembly issue a proelamation
declaring that the non fishery resources
of the high seas, outside the territorial
waLers of any State, and the bed of the
sea beyond the continental shelf, appertain to the United Nations and arc
subject to its jurisdiction and controI.21
Of more significance, on 17 August
1967, the Permanent Mission of Malta
to the United Nations proposed that the
General Assembly should, in its twentysecond (1967) session, take up a treaty
concerning the reservation to the United
Nations of the seabed and ocean floor
and the explJitation of the resources
thereof for the benefit of underdeveloped eountries.22 This item was
included on the agenda for the twentysecond session and discussions were hcld
in the Political Committee in November
and December 1967. Primarily through
the efforts of the United States and the
Soviet Union. subsLantive aCLion on the
item was postponed by the device of
appointing a Committee on the Oceans
(patterned after the previous outer
space committee) to study the proposal
further and report to the twenty-third
session.23
Thus, although action of the General
Assembly has provided a grace period,
the time for substantive decisions on the
legal status of the seabed and subsoil of
the deep ocean seems to be approaching.
Summary. The foregoing brief back/,'l"ollJ1d suggests the growing importance
of the seahed to the world cOlllmuniLy
anti the inerl~asin~ lIllcnLion iL is rl'cci\'in~. noL only from scienlists anti
technologists, but also from national
and inLernaLional decision makers. In

SII hscq ucn L chllp Ler~,

Lhis pnper will firsL
revicw the current framework of inlernational law wiLhin which or as an
extension of which solutions to the
problems posed might be found. It will
then examine the current and projected
activities on the deep seabed. With these
as a basis, the paper will then examine
several alternative regimes which might
have applicability to the seabed as well
as possible procedural methods by
which a regime might be brought into
being. Finally, tentative conclusions will
be stated.

II-THE CURRENT STATE
OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
As an initial step in attempting to
explore a possible regime for the bottom of the deep ocean, it is necessary to
examine the current status of the law of
the sea, the regimes that apply to the
various segments of the sea and the
boundaries of those segments, with particular attention to the legal regimes
applicable to the seabed and subsoil.
Perhaps the most logical order for such
a consideration is to look at the sea
starting al the land and proceeding
outward. Not unsurprisingly, as one
proceeds outward from the land, and as
the connection belween the land and
the sea hccomcs more remote, the law
applicable on the land has less and less
applicability to the sea, seabed, and
airspace ahove the sea.
Internal Waters. The waters most
close inshore are called internal waters.
These waters are those enclosed within
the baseline from which the territorial
sea is measured. The baseline generally
follows the low-water mark along the
coast, but in some cases, such as the
mouths of some bays and rivers and
along coasts d"eeply indented or fringed
hy 11IImerOllS islantls, it lIlay he a
stmight linc following the gcncntl configuration of the coast. For internal
waters, the sovereignty of the coastal
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state is eompleLe, noL only as Lo Lhe
waters, but also as to the airspace above
and the Ileahed and subsoil beneath.
They are in the same legal status as the
land territory of the state'!
The Territorial Sea. The next bclt
outward from the bascline is the territorial sea. It is a belt whose inner limit is
the baseline and whose outer limit is the
line every point of which is at a distance
from the nearest point of the baseline
equal to the breadth of the sea. 2 The
Territorial Sea Convention explicitly
declares that the sovereignty of the
coasLal sLate exLends to this narrow helt.
Such sovereignty includes the sea, the
seabed and subsoil and airspace above.3
Essentially the only difference between
the territorial sea and inLernal waters is
that the ships of foreign nations have
the right of innocent passage through
the terriLorial sea but do not have such a
right in inLernal waters. 4 Aircraft do not
enjoy a right of innocent passage
through the airspace above the territorial sea. 5
The 1958 United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea codified a great
deal of the international law pertaining
to the territorial sea, but neither that
Conference nor a similar Conference
held in 1960 was able to obtain agreement of a sufficient number of parLicipaLing staLes to eSLablish a precise
breadth of the territorial sea. The
United StaLes has always claimed a
3-mile wide territorial sea. 6 Most of the
maritime states likewise claim such a
narrow territorial sea. On the other
hand, a great number of states today
claim broader territorial seas--a number
claiming 6 miles, quite a few 12 miles,
and several extending their claims as far
as 200 miles. 7 The United States has
repeatedly stated Lhat it does not recognize any claim beyond 3 miles.8
The Contiguous Zone. Proceeding
outward frolll the tl'rritorial sea, till'
next belt is callcd the contiguous zone.
The 1958 Territorial Sea ConvenLion

empowers a eoasLal sLaL(~ to (':;tahlish
such a zone beyond its territorial sea in
which it may exercise the controlneees·
sary to prevent and punish infringement
of its customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitary regulations within its territory
of territorial sea. It may not, how(:ver,
extend beyond 12 miles from the baseline. 9
It is to be noted that with respect to
the contiguous zone, the coastal state
does not exercise the full bundle of
powers constituting sovereignty but
only a limited control or jurisdiction.
The waters of the contiguous zone are a
part of the high seas. The airspace ahove
them is free for the passage of foreign
aircraft, and (except as indicated below
as to the continental shelf) the coastal
state has no special claim as to the
seabed or subsoil.! Although a number
of statcs, including the United States,
have claimed exclusive fishing rights
within the contiguous zone, such claims
are not made on the basis of the
Territorial Sea Convention but depend
on the practice of states.!l

°

The Continental Shelf. Although the
geological conLinental shelf usually
underlies the waLers of both tl\(' t(~r ..iLorial sea and the conLiguous zone, iL is
considered afLer Lhese two zones because its outer limiL lIlay cxtelul heyonli
the houndaries of either.
Geologically, the continental shelf is
the submerged extension of the conti·
ncntal landmass which slopes gently
seaward from the low-water mark to a
point where a substantial break in grade
occurs. Generally, this break occurs at
about 100 fathoms, but this is by no
means uniform. The width of the conti·
nental shelf varies greatly. In some parts
of the world, such as off the coasts of
Peru and Chile, it lIIay be virtually
noncxistent. In other areas, such as
some parts of tht' ell!'t eoatlt of the
lInilt'd Statl'S and thl' (;nlf of 1\II'xit·n. it
lIlay he several iruruJred miles wilk I:!
AILhough the United Kingdom amI
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Venezuela cntcrcd into a treaty in 19. t~
by which they divided petroleum exploitation rights beneath thc Gulf of
Paria betwccn them,13 the event whieh
had thc most impact on the dcvelopmcnt of the law of the continental shelf
was a Proelamation by Prcsident Truman in 1945 which declared that
..... the Government of the United
States regards the natural resources of
the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but
contiguolls to the coast of the United
States as appertaining to the United
States, Sll bjed to its jurisdiction and
eontrol."14 The Proclamation made no
attempt to define or set an outer limit
on the continl!ntal shelf. However, the
press release accompanying the Proclamation stated, "Generally, submerged
land which is contiguous to the continent and which is covered by no more
than 100 fathoms (600 feet) of water is
considered as the continental shelf. "15
It remained for the 1958 U.N. Law
of ~h? .Sea Conference to provide a legal
defnutlOn and an outer limit of the
continental shelf. Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention defines the
continental shelf as the seabed and
subsoil of the high seas adjacent to the
coast to a depth of 200 meters or,
beyond that depth, to where the depth
of the superjaccnt water permiL'> the
exploitation of the natural rcsources of
such arc as. The coastal state is given
" ... sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring Lthe contincntal shelf] and
exploiting its natural resources. "16 The
convention explicitly provides, however,
that the rights exercised by the coastal
state ovcr the continental shelf shall not
affect the legal status of the waters
above .the shelf as high seas, or that of
the airspace above those waters. 17
~hus,,, the coa~tal state's "sovereign
rights are restricted to the seabl,d and
suh~oi1. ~hips mill airaart :trt' rrt'I' ttl
COlli!' and go in th!' wall'rs mill air~pa,'"
above the continental shelf with essentially the same freedom as they have on

other parts of the high seas.
The High Seas. All waters not included within the territorial sea or the
internal waters of a slate are high seas.
The .1?58 Convcntion on the High Seas
sp~elfIcally provides: "The high seas
hel.ng open to all nations, no Stale may
vahdly purport to suhject any part of
t~lem to its sovcreignty."lB This provision must, of course, be read in context
with the other articles of the Convention and with the Conventions on the
Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf.
These provide for lhe excrcisl~ of SOIlIl:
of the clcmcnts of sovereignty hy
coastal statcs over certain areas of the
high seas and over certain activities
occurring on the high seas, as has
already hcen seen. Bul it is saf!! to say
that .generally the regime of thc high
seas IS one of freedom. The High Seas
Convention specifically enumerates the
following freedoms as appertaining to
the high seas for all States, coastal and
noncoastal: freedom of navigation; freedom of fishing; freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; and freedom to fly over the high seas. It also
specifically states that this list is not
exclusive. The Convention provides that
the freedoms of the high seas are lo be
exercised by all states" ... wilh reasonahle n'gard lo the interests of other
States in their exercise of the fn!e(iom
of the high SI!as. "J I)
The freedom of the high seas is
protected, not hy the cxcreise of jurisdiction by a supranational body or by
coastal states, but by the principle of
the "flag state." Under this principle,
persons who conduct activities on the
high seas must operate under the flag of
some nation, which is then responsihle
for and has jurisdiction over activilies
conducted under ils flag. 20
EXI'~pl us to thc freedom to lay
~lIhlllarllll' l'ahll's anti pipdinl'~, thl' Ili!!I1
~I'a~ CI)IJ\'('ntiou i8 8ill'nt a8 to till~
seabed and suhsoil. Thus, beyond the
edgc of the Continental Shelf, about
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\\ hich more will he :;aid below. there arc
no provisions of LreaLy law applicable to
the resources of the seahed and su bsoil
of the high seas. Since man's exploiLation has to this date becn essenLially
limiLed to the ConLinenLal Shelf, there is

praeLicc of sLaLe:> l'uffil'il'nL to esLablish any cusLomary inLernaLiollal law on
this suhjcet.
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Figure ] depicLs in visual form the
divisions of the ocean already discussed.

Figure 1.--Legal Divisions of the Oceans
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The Outer Limi L of the Continental
Shelf. Before pr<)(;eeiling Lo analyze
possihle alLc:rrwtive regimes for the scahed and subsoil of the deep ocean, it is
necessary to eont'icler one lIIore preliminary il'slIe. ThaL is the contention,
advanced by somc'. thaL such a regime
already exi::;ts. The argument for this
con Len Lion is hasc,d on the wording of
Artielc ] of thc ContinenLal Shelf ConvenLion, which reads as follows:
For the purpose of these articles,
the term 'contincntal shclf' is used as
referring (a) 10 the sl'abl'd and subsoil
of the submarine areas adjaccn t to the
coast but outside the area of the
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters

or, heyond that limit. to where the
depth of th,' superjacent waters atimils
of the exploitation of till' natural
rcsourccs of the said areas: (h) to the
seabed and suhsoil of similar suhm:lrinc
arcas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
Thc definition for the ouLer limit of
the conLinental shelf is thus Lwofold.
Either it is at the poinL at which the
depth of water reaches 200 meLers or, at
the point heyond that dc'pth at which
the state of teeilllological development
at any particular moment permits the
exploitation of Lh(· natural resources of
the seabed and su bsoil. Based on this
seconr!, flexihle crit('rion for dc:termining the outer edge, 80l11e have
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argued that as technolobrical advanccs
pcrmit exploitation of rcsources in
dcepcr and deeper water, the boundary
moves further and further to sea. According to proponents of this theory,
the only limit to such extensions outward from the coastal state is the
median line between opposite coastal
states. 21
This result, while having the facile
attraction of simplicity and being in
accord with the literal words of the
Convention, does not appear properly
to reflect the intent of the Convention.
A brief examination of the background
and ncgotiating history of the 195B
Convention will help in determining the
true intent and meaning of Article l.
The difficulty faced by the delegates
to the Confercnce was that they were
trying to provide a precise and certain
legal definition for a geological concept
which was not precise and certain.
Additionally, as stated by the U.S.
spokesman on the Continental Shelf
CommiLLee, " ... thc Conference was
tingell with politics. "22
The Conferencc had as a basis for
initial discussion a draft convention
developed by the I ntcrnational Law
Commission (ILC) over a period of
several years. 23 I\lr. Garcia-Amador, the
representative of Cuba and a noted
international lawyer who was also a
memher of the ILC, pointed out that
the limit of (,xploitability criterion was
accep ted hy thc ILC in 1951, dropped
in 1953 and then readopted in 1956 as a
result of the unanimous resolution
passed at the Inter-American Specialized
Conference on Conservation of Natural
Resources: Continental Shelf and
Oceanic Waters held at Ciudad Trujillo,
Dominican Rcpuhlic, in early 1956. He
stated that the ILC draft text had both
a moral and a legal basis in that it
covered thc needs both of countries
with a continental shelf and of those
whose adjacent submarine areas did not
meet the currently accepted definition
of the continental shelf but were never-

theless rich, exploitable areas. lie
pointed to Chile as one of the special
cases hrought to the aLLentiotl of the
1LC. Coral reefs off the coast of Chile
were exploitahle to depths of perhaps
1,000 metcrs and could not thercfore be
considered as part of the continental
shdf in the accepted geological sense.
"Nevertheless, it was only ri!!ht that
such cases should he taken into account,
and the criterion of possihle exploitation had been acccpted with the ohjeet
of doing justice to all states. "24 Thus,
there is nothing in the history of the
dcvelopment of the draft convention by
the ILC to suggest that the ILC conceived of the houndary as subject to
limitless outward expansion. The problem they sought to meet by the exploitability criterion was rather the case
of exploitahle seabed resources in
waters which, though close inshore,
were decper than 200 meters.
At the Geneva Confcrence the discussions of the I LC draft article which
eventually hecame Article I of the
Convention, the definition Article,
developed into a dehate hel ween advocates of a fixed criterion and those who
advocated the exploitahility criterion.
Although some delegates pointed to the
possible danger thaI the literal words of
the flexihle exploitahiJity criterion
might lead to limitless outward extensions of coastal state jurisdictiol1,25 the
principal argument expressed by those
who favored a singh~, fixed criterion was
thaL the vagueness of the exploitahility
criterion would lead to disputes between states.26 The adherents of the
exploitahility crit('rion based thcir view
principally on three l-,'I"OUlllls, namely (1)
the fact that a ~OO meter depth did not
necessarily define the edge of the continental shelf in a geological sense--in
sOllie areas the edge was at I-,'I"eater
depths;27 (~) the (;arcia-Amador argument of justice for those coastal staLes
which had no continental shelf in the
geological sense;2!l and (B) the fact that
in 1%8 the continental shelves of the
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world were largely unexplored and that
it would be unwise to establish a fixed
criterion for defining a geological phenomenon about which so little was
known. 29 None of the adherents for
this position suggested lhat thcy viewed
the exploitability criterion as a basis for
indefinite extensions of the "legal"
continental shelf seaward.
The principle of "adjacency," which
is ineluded in the Article 1 definition,
was impliedly recognized in the arguments of many delegates. However, only
one speaker pinned this point down
preCisely, and although he was not
expressly supported by representatives
of other governments, neither did anyone express disagreement with the
proposition he expressed. He was the
delegate of the Dominican Republic,
who stated:
The thought underlying that Article
was that the continental shelf was a
prolongation of the land and, therefore, subject to considerations of contiguity or proximity. Exploitation beyond thc point at which the relation·
ship of proximity ended might be
based on occupation, but it would not
be covered by the provisions of Articles [1 and 2].3 0

Thus, although the record is not
completely free from doubt, it seems
reasonably elear from the history of the -development of the Article 1 definition
that the framers of the Continental
Shelf Convention did not intend, by
that Convention, to allocate the resources of the deep ocean floor among
the coastal states of the world. This
interpretation is shared by a number of
seholars who have researched the subject. 31 Further, this interpretation is
implicit in the current consideration of
the subject in the United Nations.
Otherwise, the United Nations would be
engaging in a pointless debate on a
subject which had already been resolvcd
by the 1958 Geneva Conference.
Nonetheless, the boundary is imprecise and ambiguous. As a result, any
program for the establishment of a

regime for the deep seahed (other than
coastal state jurisdiction) would have to
have as one of its e1cments thc establishment of a more precise outer boundary
for the continental shelf.
It is the ocean floor beyond that
boundary--whatever it may eventually
be--with which the remainder of this
paper is concerned.

II1--SEABED AND
SUBSOIL ACTIVITIES
In this chaptcr there wiII he an
examination of the types of activities
projected for the seabed and subsoil of
the deep ocean, an appraisal of the
United States interests in each of such
activities, and an allempt to define
criteria, based on each kind of activities,
for developing a regime covering these
activities.
Exploration and Research. Despite
the fact that man has traveled on the
surface of the sea since the beginning of
recorded history and has used the sea as
a source of food for perhaps even a
longer period, he knows wry littlc
about the ocean depths and particularly
the bottom of the sea. Man has photographed and mapped the back side of
th~ moon 240,000 miles away, but hc
has "explored only about !) J1(:r<~(:Jll of
the bottom of the seas which comprisc
71 percent of the earth's surface'! For
the foreseeable future, therefore, the
most prominent activity with respect to
the bottom of the deep ocean will
undoubtedly be exploration and research. Such exploration and research
are a necessary prelude to productive
uses of the deep ocean floor.
The United States, as one of the
leading users of the oceans for both
peaceful commerce and national dcfense, has a preemincnt interest in
fostering exploration and research in the
deep oceans. But only in rc:ccnt years
has that interest been given very great
attention. Only a few years ago, ocean-
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ography was an obscurc scicntific discipline practiced mostly at a few highly
specialized institutions, such as the
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute at
Woods Hole, Massachusetts, and the
Scripps Institute of Oceanography at La
Jolla, California. Even the Navy did not
accord it a very prominent place as
evidenced by the fact that until quite
recently responsibility for o.ceanography
was divided between several offices, the
principal oncs being the Office of Naval
Research and the Navy Hydrographic
Office. It was not until 1966 that the
Hydrographer of the Navy, whose
primary function had been the provision
of charts and navigation publications to
the Navy, was redesignated as the
Oceanographer of the Navy and given
full responsibility for coordination of
the entire Navy Oceanographic Program. 2
Today, however, the field of oceanography and related sciences are receiving much more attention. The oceans
have become a "glamour" scientific and
engineering subjcct. Bctween 1963 and
1967 total annual expcnditures (governmcnt and private) more than doubled,
rising from approximately $1 billion per
year to an annual rate of over $2
billion.3 The U.S. Government research
and development programs took an even
more dramatic jump--frolll $24 million
in 1958 to $220 million in 1967.4 Giant
aerospace companies, some with no
prior experience in the field, have
suddenly taken an interest in it now
that the government has allocated large
research and development funds.S As a
result of the intense and increasing
concern that the United States 'should
have a comprehensive and wellcoordinated plan for exploitation of the
oceans, Congress enacted the Marine
Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966.6 This Act established the National Council on I\iarine
Resources and Engineering Development in the Executive Office of the
President to advise and assist the Presi-

dent in the planning and conduct of a
coordinated Federal program in marine
science and technology. Indicative of
the importance attached to the program
by the President and the Congress, the
Council is headed by the Vice President
and includes in its membership the
Secretaries of State, Interior, Commerce, Health, Education and Welfare,
Transportation, and Navy, the Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission, and
the Director of the National Science
Foundation.7
It is thus apparent that the United
States has now embarked on a comprehensive program of exploration and
research in the oceans. Although no
authoritative figures showing the percentage of the total oceanography effort
which is devoted to exploration of tbe
sea bottom are available, the emphasis
which is being placed on deep diving
submersibles indicates that it is large.
Within the United States alone a great
variety of deep diving experimental submersibles is already in operation and
more are planned. Many of these are
sophisticated manlled vessels, capahle of
exploring the deep cst portiolls of the
ocean bottom and providing a great deal
of information about it.S
Since research and exploration do
not gcnerally contcmplatc the construction of expensive bottom installations
or the removal of large quantities of
bottom material, most favorable for
exploration and research would be a
regime under which maximum freedom
is preserved-freedom of access to all
areas of the sea bottom, freedom to
take samples of the seabed and subsoil,
freedom to map and take photographs,
freedom to construct temporary installations on the bottom, and the Iike. 9
The only desirable restriction is that
those engaged in research or exploratory
activities be protected from hazards,
such as underwater collisions, jettisoning of objects from above, and fouling
of working and safety lines.
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Extraction of Mineral Resources. As
has been touched upon in Chapter I, the
excitement about the seabed and the
interest 011 the part of some to internationalize it has been brought about by
the discovery that the seabed (and
perhaps the subsoil) is a potential source
of valuable mineral resources. Although
the extraetion of such resources is so far
essentially limited to the continental
shelf and generally to the shallower
parts thereof, any regime for the deep
ocean bed must take account of the
potential exploitation of its mineral
resources.
The most interest has been excited
by the manganese nodules which arc
found over vast areas of the ocean fioor.
Phosphorite nOllules also hold the
promise of early exploitation. l\Ian's
ever-ex panding demands for new
sources of raw materials may push him
to exploit these much earlier than was
thought possible only a few years ago.
One observer has stated it thus:
... while rising demand squeezes tradi·
tional supplics and pushes [raw material] prices up, a rapidly developing
technology is pushing down thc cost of
working ocea.nie resources. Whcncver
these rising price and lowering cost
curves cross, man turns to the sea.! 0

Dr . .lolm P. Craven, Chief Scientist of
the Navy's Deep Submergence Project
and a promincnt authority in lhc ficld,
has suggesled that. the time when this
will occur may not be too far away:
It has been suggested by some that
the problem of deep ocean mining is
remote and that exploiters will be
relatively few. The presumption here is
the projectcd high cost for vehicles and
equipment designed to operate on the
ocean bottom. On the contrary, al·
though thcy do not exist a.t pres('nl. it
is contended that low cost vehicles
capable of exploitation nrc leclmolop;i.
cally feasible amI will be realized with.
in thr nl'xl two (lI'calll's. .., 11 has
come as a ~1Irpri<'l' to Ih(' uniniLiah'II,
alltl ('ven 10 S(lIIl!' prof('~~ional naval
arehitl'cls, that at pn'~l'nt the major
invrstment cost of dcep submersibles is
in thc surface ships and sllrface support

systems now rcquirrd for their opcration. That is prcfCnUy thc case becausc, except for static pressurc, the
greatcst forces and most dangerous
dynamies are at or near the surface and
its attendant wave system.
In summary, the projection of deep
ocean technology is slIeh that, in the
period beyond 1930, we may expect a
significant proliferation of nonmilitary
submersible and low-cost equipment
capable of operating throughout the
water column at or on the bottom and
capable of exploiting the sea bed or the
resources of the sea bed.l1

For the mining of manganese nodules
and phosphorite nodules, however, man
probably will not have to wait until
such bottom operating vehicles are
available. These resources could probahly he cOlllmercially exploiLed now,
utilizing simple drag or dredge lechniques. Likewise, the industry has already demonstrated its capabiliLy for
drilling oil wells in water over 200
meters deep. Thus, any regime for the
ocean bed must take inLo account the
reality of already initiated activities
directed toward the exploitation of
mineral resources.
For a drag or drcd~e type sea floor
mining operation, the investment and
preliminary development expenses for
lhe enlrepreneur would be extremely
.
. I'
Iarge. J?- J''or any opl.'ralion
lI\VO
vlllg
c}"lcllsivc drilling or suh~oil extraction,
expenses would obviously be much
greater.l 3 Thus, the key element of a
rCbrimc which would make possihle the
exploitalion of the mineral resources of
the subsoil and seabed would be an
assurance to the developer that, once he
has made a largc inveslmenL, he will
havc some measure of exclusivily lo
protect him from "claim jumpers." As a
'"ading aUlhority, Dr. ALhl'h;Lan Spilhaus of the University of i\linnesola, has
staled:
If we are ~oing to rxploit til(' <'I,n hy
privah- illllnsiry. W(' II1l1sl work 0111
laws Ihal ('om ~ivl' :<1)1111' killil of a
patt'nt or grant <'I) Ihat LhoS!~ who risk
rapital in its exploitation can be assun'd a reasonahle reward.1·~

469
There arc various possihilities, still to he
explored, how thi& exclusive right to
exploitation could be acquired; this,
however, would appear to be a matter
of secondary importance to the exploiting entrepreneur. His primary interest
would be in obtaining sufficient assurance that, under the usual business risk
principles, he would have an opportunity for sufficient profit to compensate him for the financial risks involved.
The community interest in developing
the resources of the seabed would, in
tum, be served by providing this assurance.l 5
Living Resources. The claim is often
made that the population explosion will
soon exhaust the food resources of the
land areas of the earth and that man will
increasingly tum to the sea as a source
of practically unlimited animal protein.
But if this is to occur, man must
markedly improve his harvest of the
Jiving resources of the sea. It has been
estimated that in 1964 only 4 percent
of the ocean's actual production of
Jiving resources of the kind that man
was harvesting were actually harvested.l 6 This small output results
primarily frbm the fact that the
methods used today for harvesting the
sea are still basicully those of the huntcr
of wild allillluis on lund. Improved
equipment and methods, together with
much research, have resulted in marked
improvements over the past few years
and further improvements are promised.l7 However, many insist that the
best way to utilize the sea is to adapt
the ways of land agriculture to the sea.
They visualize vast fish farms, fenced
off by walls of huhbles in which fish are
grown just as cattle are on modern land
ranches.l B Although such schemes may
sound farfetched, similar processes are
already in use in many areas of the
world for cultivation of mollusks, dams,
oysters, culturt,tl Pl'UrlS mill, to u limitl'll
extent, fish.l9 A number of prominent
scientists have given their support to

them as heing prael icnl, at least in the
shallower, well-aerated parts of the
ocean.20 The limitntion to the shallow,
well-aerated portions of the sea makes it
likely that most of the sea floor activities connected with such fish farms
would be confined to the continental
shelves. Consequently, activities connccted with the living resources of the
sea should have little impact on a regime
for the deep seabed.
Disposal of Wastes. Since time immemorial the sea has been used as a
dumping ground for wastes. Because of
the vastness of the oceans and the
variety and abundance of sea life, the
seas have been able to turn most of
these wastes into valuable nutricnts or
at worst dilute them enough to be
harmless. 21 With the coming of the
nuclear age, however, a new problem
has been introduced-radioactive wastes.
The same qualities which made the
ocean an attractive dumping ground for
conventional waste products have made
it attractive for disposal of radioactive
wastes. 22 Although such radioactive
wastes take a number of forms (e.g.,
coolant fluids from shore-based or ship
nuclear power plants, liquid wastes from
nuclear manufacturing plants or plants
Cllgllgcd ill revitalization () f fud for
nuclear plants,23 the only kind which
would be within the scope of the
current paper would be solid wastes
which would come to rest on the ocean
floor. At the present time, the U.S.
practice is to bury highly contaminated
radioactive wastes on land. Only the
slightly contaminated refuse created by
day-to-day operations of nuclear reactors. such as gloves, clothes, and rags,
is scaled in containers for (It'positing in
deep recesses of the ocean.24 Because
of the increasing prominence of nuclear
power and the ever greater quantities of
fOlIlioOll"ti\'c resil\uI's that will ),1' ('reatl'li
in futurc years, llOwl'vl~r, this U~l! of the
deep ocean and its floor will prohably
increase.
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Such use, however, does not have to
be exclusive in the sense that only one
nation or individual could use a particular area. It will be necessary, however,
to insure that such wastcs, once placed,
not be disturbed until they are no
longer a radioactive hazard.
Defense Activities. A detailed discussion of specific defense activities on the
floor of the deep ocean is not possible
in an unclassified paper. Nor is such a
detailed, specific discussion necessary in
order to determine the scope and nature
of the U.S. national security interest in
the ocean floor. Officials of the Department of Defense and Department of the
Navy have spoken publicly about tlus
interest and have sketehed the key
elements in unclassified form. Several of
these statements are listed in the bibliography. Perhaps the most comprehensive and frank public discussion of
the defense interests occurred in an
address by Assistant Secretary of the
Navy Robert A. Frosch on October 7,
1967.25 He listed the following as the
more significant defense interests:
(1) Sea basing of strategic deterrent:
Future design of sea based deterrents
following POLARIS/POSEIDON may
take many forms. Underwater silos, for
example, are a possibility. Should that
be so, it may be that the maritime
nuclear powers would like to keep the
continental shelves and deep ocean
available for some use by such military
systems. This, however, would not
necessarily be a bar to use of these
areas of the ocean bottom also for
exploration and exploitation of natural
resources. 26

(2) Warning and surveillance systems: The rules for military use of the
sea should not forbid installations on
the ocean bottom for tlle detection of
submarines. ... The rules should not
deny freedom of tllC seas for deployment of strategic detection and warn·
ing devices. 27
(3) Other units deployed on the $('a
floor: Tlw furtlll'r extension of military capabilities to thl' seabl'd is a clt-ar
possibility.... The right to deploy
units on the sea floor in intcmational

waters for the purpose of inspecting
for mines or other irnpediments to the
legitimate exercise of the freedom of
tlle seas in particular seems useful. 28
(4) Protection of nationals engaged
in sea floor activities: One other mili.
tary possibility to be noted specifically
is protection of those engaged in exploitation of the sea. United States
capital is unlikely to be risked unless it
is United States policy to protect the
investments against foreign or piratical
invasions. Tills will be a Navy and/or
Coast Guard mission. 29

Summarizing, Dr. Frosch stated:
From the standpoint of the United
States military capabilities, it would
appear to be generally advantageous if
claims of the seabed were limited to
exploration and exploitation. The right
of military surveillance could be en·
dangered by permitting establishment
of sovereignty or control jurisdiction,
either by nations or international
bodies, over tlle sea bottom.
It is militarily desirable to: (l) minimize any extension of territorial seas;
(2) closely limit sovereignty over the
continental shelves; and (3) maintain
freedom of the air space above the high
seas. 30

Thus, the United Slall's hm; l\ vilal
interest in preserving the right to utilize
the seabed of the deep oeean for defense activities. Such defense activities
would bc favored by a regime of freedorn--onc in which eaeh nation would
be free to carry out legitimate defense
activities on the sea bottom beyond the
continental shelf but without any exclusive appropriation of the sea bottom or
a portion thereof solely for the benefit
of one nation.
Other Activities. Although some of
the more ardent proponents of increased exploration and exploitation of
the ocean visualize usc of the sculled for
such activitics as vacation resorts, colo·
nics [or semipermancnt residence of
sl'i('nlisls, eu~inl'er:;. and llilwr IIndt'r·
Wall'f \\'Orkt'f:; in tWt';1I\ i!ltln:;lrit':\ (t'.I-(.,
mining), and even us sites for largl',
(lOlliI'd permanent eiLies,31 these uses
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arc so far in the future that consideration of a legal regime applicable to such
activitics would seem to be pure speculation at this time. Even as to activities
within the realm of early realization
many uncertainties exist, making it difficult to visualize specific legal problems
that may be faced. Only experience
with the management of activities in the
ncar future can provide a foundation
upon which the principles for management of later, more comprehensive
activities may be built. Thus, those "far
out" activities wiII be considered in the
later discussion only to the extent that
actions taken now might prejudice later
logical development of a regime to
embrace them.
Summary. The foregoing survey of
activities that are most likcly to take
place on the seabed within the foreseeable future suggests that for exploration, research, and defense activities, the
basic principle of a regime which would
favor such activities would be one of
freedom, i.e., a shared or "inclusive"
right to carry them out without hindrance, but also without excluding
others frolll the same right. The disposal
of radioactive wastes would likewise call
for this type of regime. On the other
hand, the exploitation of the resources
of the seabed and suhsoil would seem to
be beller served by the principle of
exclusivity, i.e., a right to appropriate
the resources of a particular area, at
least for a specified period of time,
solely for the benefit of the exploiter
and to the exclusion of others.
It is now possible to proceed to an
examination of the types of regimes
which have been suggested for the seabed and subsoil of the deep ocean to
determine how they fit the criteria
derived above.
IV-ALTERNATIVE REGIMES
FOR THE SEABED
Possible Alternatives. Legal regimes
which have already been suggested for

the seabed beyond the limits of the
continental shelf include confirming the
jurisdiction of the coastal state to the
midpoint of the ocean, and establishing
ownership in the United Nations. Traditional principles of international law
suggest two additional ones, in particular: (1) consideration of the seabed as
res nullius, that is, the property of no
one and thus subject to appropriation
by states under traditional principles of
international law, and (2) consideration
of the seabed as res communis, that is,
the property of the world community
and therefore not subject to the establishment of a national jurisdiction over
it (but, as is accepted for fish in the high
seas, subject to harvesting by all). This
Chapter is devoted to an analysis of
these four possible regimes.
Res Nullius. In customary international law the term res nullius or terra
nullius refers to territory which, although capable of being acquired, has
not yet been acquired by any sovereign.l The high seas themselves have
long been considered as being res communis and not capable of appropriation
by any state. 2 This principle was confirmed by the High Seas Convention
adopted at Geneva in 1958.3 The fact
that superjacent waters are not subject
to appropriatioll, howevcr, Ih)(~t! 1I0t
nccessarily mean that the seabed has the
same status. 4 In the 19th century even
so great a champion of the freedom of
the seas as England claimed ownership
of the pearl fishing beds under the high
seas off the coasts of Ceylon and Bahrein on the grounds of uninterrupted
and undisputed proprietorship of successive rulers since time immemorial. 5
The Bey of Tunis, during the same
period, claimed sponge beds under certain areas of the high seas. 6
The Continental Shelf Convention
provides ample evidence that the status
of the seabed can be separated juridically from the status of the superjacent
waters. That Convention clearly spells
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out that the status of the waters above
the Continental Shelf as high seas is not
affected by the coastal state's jurisdiction over the seahed and subsoi1.7 Thus,
there would appear to be no legal
incongruity in separate legal statuses for
the seabed and superjacent waters.
If we assume that the seabed beyond
the continental shelf could be considered as res llUlliILS, it is necessary to
determine what would be the means by
which a nation would acquire jurisdietion, and what would be the advantages
to the Unitell States and to the world
cOJlllllunity if this status were established.
The method traditionally recognized
as vesting sovereignty8 to territory
which is res lIullius is occupaLion.
Aequisition of sovercignty by occupation requires, first, intentional appropriation of territory not already under
the sovereignty of any other state;9 and
second, "effective occupation."
In modern international law, "effective occupation" is a tcrm not necessadly denoting physical settlement but
rather meaning the actual, continuous
and peaceful exercisc of the functions
of a statc in rclation to the territory.
Professor C.ll.M. Waldock, in a dcfinitive examination of the most recent
World \.ourt cases on the suhject, has
concluded that till: Lwo csscntial dements are (I) the intcntion and will to
act as sovercign and (2) some actual
exercise or display' of sovereignty. Thc
second of these clements, in turn, eonsists of four clements which additi.onally
go to prove the first. These are that the
cxercise of sovcreignty must be:

(1) Pcaccful--Le., not contested from
the bcginning by competing acts of
sovercignty.
(2) Actual--i.c .• not a mere prrtense.
It IllIH~t include ads whieh :Ire ,·iL her a
gl'nuine l:xcrcise of Ilolllcstic jurit'dietion or an intcrnational dcaling, as hy
trcaty.

(3) Sufficient to confer a valid Litle
to sovereignty-i.e., sufficient undcr the
circumstanccs of the particular territory. In sparsely inhahited or uninhahitable territory, the occupying staLe may
not be required to maintain even a
single official permanently on the spot.
(4) Continuous--this, like thc degree
of sufficiency, depends on thc circumstances. lO
Several noted intcrnational lawycrs,
during the formative period of Lhc
contincntal shclf doctrine, gave considcration to thc theory of occupatiou
as a mcans for thc establishmcnt of
national claims to the seabed. Professor
Waldock was one of those who favored
the doctrinc as u po::,..;ihle hasis for sudl
claims. llc argued that thc rcccnt itlLcrnational court cases had negated the
requirement that actual settlement or
exploitation is a sine qua non of effective occupation. In his view:
Occupation, in the modem law is
the assumption of sovereignty ratlll'r
than tile appropriation of property and
tllcse three cases [Islantl of ['almas,
Ens/em Greenland. and CliPIIC'rlon
Islantl] lay down clearly that what is
rcquired is effcctivc display of state
activity in such a manncr as thc circumstances of tile territory dcmand.
No doubt, an international tribunal
will still seek 10 dislin/.,'1lish hrlwC'r.n a
~"nuilw, ,'ffecliv(~ manifestation "f
slale functions and a Jlurely paJler
claim but in dcsolatr, or, in the case of
thc sea-bed, submergcd territory, it wiII
only dcmand the minimum state activity, which the nature of the territory
calIs for. On this basis, cffeetive assumption of jurisdiction over fairly
cxtcnsive areas of sea-bed can probably
be establish cd witllOUt nccessarily
showing much or even anr physical
activity on tile sea-bed itself. 1

But Waldock ha$tl'I\I~11 to add that
proximity or contiguity is also an
imp orLan t fucLor in establishing the
vali,lilv of :;llI'h dailll:;.12
.I \l(i~l' l.auLl'rpacht arglwd fur a JllOI'I!
stringcnt tcst:
'1'0 speak of occupation of submarine
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areas is to usc language even more
unreal than that refl'rrillg to occupation, as a basis of territorial title, of
arctic and antarctic regions. States have
indeed put fonvard c1aims--not altogcther uncontrovcrted-to the latter,
but they havc not bascd them on any
principlc gcrmane to occupation, effective or fictitious.
.•. As no cffeetive acts of occupation (in the ordinary scnse of the
word), eoncurrcntlr with the act of
proclamation of title or at any ascertainable period in the foreseeable
future, arc possihle in rclation to contiguous suhmarine areas, it is found
ncccssary to faU back upon tIle barest
minimum of occupation which reduces
occupation to a shadow of its natural
meaning, namely, to a proclamation
and, possibly, the granting of concessions. 1 3

.J udgc l.nuLcrpachL wcnt 011 to say
Lhat "cffccLivcncss" supported hy COIltiguity was thc tcst. IIc Lhcn statcd:
lIut cffectivcness is not a magic formula which can be applied with mathematical prceision. It is effectiveness
relativc to the situation and the eireUlllstanec~. It may range frOl1l tlle
requirl'lllcnt of intcnsive administration in cverr 'nook and comer' in a
dcnsely populatcd and developed arca
to mcrc 'statl! activity' manifesting
itsl-If in thc conclusion of treatiee and
confermcnt of concessions by an
authoritr situated in a narrowly circumscrihed part of tllC territory or
evcn ou tsidc it; alHl it may assume thc
forlll of a merc proclamation.... As
already SU!!gcstcd thc conc(!ptions of
cffeetivI! occupation and contiguity,
bcillg fI-lative, arc but a starting point.
It is within thc Icgitimate province of
thc judicial function-and of statcsmanship-to usc thcm with such discretion as thc equitics of thc easc and
considcrations of stability require. 14

Professor ltichard Young, on the
othcr hand, r~jcctcrl the doctrinc of
occupation cntirely, stating that it:
•.. reintroduces into intcmationallaw
the idca of fictitious occupation as a
v.did basis of title. That concept, found
by cxpl'ricllce to he a fertile breeder of
eontroversr, has hecn largely rcjeeted
in modem times, save pcrhaps for the
polar areas. The wisdom of readmitting

it willi respcet to submarine areas is at
least questionable. To insist that
occupation is necessary undcr a gencral
rule, and then to admit a spurious
occupation as sufficient, is dcvious
reasoning. Thc necessity of a fiction
strongly suggests that tIlC problcm is in
the wrong pigconhole, and that claims
to submarinc areas require different
treatmcnt from claims to land territory.l5

As wiII he recallcd, thc contincntal
shdf has hccn placed in a differcnt
"pigconholc"--onc hased on thc dcpth
of thc supeljaecnt watcr and adjaccncy
to thc claiming sLate. For submarinc
areas beyond Lhc continental shclf, however, thcrc is no convenient "pigeonholc" rcad ily availahlc for disposal of
thc vast areas of the scab cd. Occupation, dcspite its fictitious character, has
ccrtain c1cmcnts to commend it for
consirlcration. Thc forcmost of these is
that dcspitc uncertainties and ambiguities in thc docLrinc, it does prescribe
certain minimal criteria which appcar to
hc gcncrally acccpLcd. The idca of effcctive occupation of thc arca claimed
would certainly servc as a damper on
broad, exclusive national c1aillls. Even in
the inho:;piLahlc environllIent of the
decp seabed, sOllie aeLiviLies hrrcatcr than
mcre proclamations would be, requircd
to meet the tcst. Th us, perhaps the
hroad, sweeping unilateral claims which
marked thc history of naLional territorial sea claims could hc avoidcd.
On the oLher hand. as Young has
pointed out, thc doctrine has been u a
fertilc hrccdcr of controvcrsy. "16 Tying
an ambiguous concept to an arca of the
earth which is largely unexplored and
uncxploited. and apparently for SOIllC
timc yet unexploiLable in a mcaningful
scnsc, would eertainly hreed additional
controversy. Not only is it unccrtain as
to what typcs of activities would he
surficientto eonsLitute cffective occupation. bllt also th(' physical charactcristics of tIll' sea do not s\lg~cst any
readily idcnlifiahlr' nwans of rletermining thc boundaries of an arca which
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might be occupied.l 7
From the standpoint of the United
States interests, application of the doctrine of occupation to the seabed would
probably be a net advantage. Within the
foreseeable future only a few of the
more highly developed, technologically
advanced nations would be in a position
to make claims under this doctrine.
Despite a relatively late start in the
field, the United States is now well
ahead in the undersea technology race.
Dr. Edward Wenk, Executive Secretary
of the National Council on Marine
Resources and Engineering Development, recently stated that the United
States has a 5 to 1 edge over all other
nations combined in its ability to probe
the untapped wealth of the oceans.1 8
Furthermore, the technological inability
of other states to assert valid claims to
areas of the deep ocean bed would
preserve to the United States (at least
for a time) the right of inclusive use of
the seabed for the continuation of its
rescarch and exploratory work, radioactivc waste disposal, and defense activities in unclaimed areas.
The very properties which would
appear to make adoption of the occupation theory of advantage to the United
States (and by the same reasoning to
other technologically advanced nations
such as the United Kingdom, lISSIt,
France, and Japan) would probably
make it unacceptable to the less advanced states. Their lack of technological capability would permanently freeze
them out of any access to the resources
of the deep ocean, for presumably as
their technology and financial resources
would increase, so too would those of
the advanced nations, thus leaving the
backward states with only the "leftovers" for their occupation and claim.
Fear of this·-and the desire that future
exploitation of thc seabed should primarily hem'fit tl1l' (It'v('lopin~ nation:>-pervaded till' slah'menls of lIIany of t h('
smaller nations during the debate on the
Malta resolution at the Twenty-second

Session of the United Nations General
Assemhly.1 9
Thus, although adoption of a regime
based on the res nullius doctrine would
appear to have certain favorable features
from the standpoint of the United
States, its acceptability to the less developed states would appear to be
highly questionable.
Res Communis. The high seas are
open to all nations and no state may
validly purport to subject any part of
them to its sovereignty.20 Article 2 of
the High Seas Convention lists four
specific freedoms which are included
within the doctrine of freedom of the
high seas, but, in prefacing the listing by
the term inter alia, it indicates that the
list does not exhaust the types of
activities which nations are free to
conduct on the high seas. 21 Included
among the additional types of activities
are naval exercises, including gunfire,
torpedo, and bombing practices; weapons testing; wastc disposal; and rescarch
and exploration.22 All activities on thc
high scas are governed by the general
prescription of Article 2 that:
These freedoms, and others which
arc recognized by the general principles
of international law, shall be exercised
by all States with reasonable regard to
the interests of other States in their
exercise of the fre(~dolll of the hi~h
seas.

The device which has insured respect
for the rights of others in an area not
subject to the jurisdiction of any state is
the doctrine of nationality of ships. This
doctrine requires that a ship be registered in some state as a prerequisite to
its right to sail on the high seas. The
state of registry-the flag state--in turn is
required to exercise its jurisdiction over
the ship and crew to insure their compliance with the international law of the
hi~h seas. 23 On the high seas, thl~
jnri~(lil'li()n of the fl:,~ :ltah~ ig ('xdllsiVl'.2·~

The freedom of the high seas for the
lawful use of all nations (but for
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appropriatioJl by nonc) has given risc to
the use of the term res omnium commlwis or res communis, that is, belonging to all states equally, as being descriptive of the legal status of the high seas.
Although the description is not precisely accurate, it will be used in the
remainder of this paper as a shorthand
means of referring to the principles of
freedom applicable to the high seas.
Neither the phrase res commlwis nor
the doctrine of freedom means, however,
that the resources of the sea cannot be
appropriated by a state or its nationals.
The right to take fish from the high seas
provides the elearest, and most firmly
established, example that the seas'
resources can be appropriated. What the
doe trine does mean is that no state can
appropriate an area of the high scas for
exploitation solely by its nationals. The
distinction between a status of res nullius and res communis is that in the case
of the former, certain aets may vest title
to a particular territory or area in a
sovereign; in the latter, title to resources
vests upon their reduction to possession.
Since fish and other resources of the
high seas are currently harvested in this
manner, obviously the same theory provides one possible regime for the seabed
beyond the continental shelf.
The theory behind such a regime
would be that the seabed and suhsoil of
the deep oceans, and the resources
thereof, are a "free good," like the air
we breathe or the fish of the high seas.
The basis for such a theory is the
inexhaustibility of the resource. If the
resources are indeed inexhaustible, then
there is no need for exclusive rights.
McDougal and Burke have stated the
case for such a theory thus:
This inclusive aeccss to, and enjoyment
of, the oceans has encouraged the
diffcrcnt communities and pcoplcs to
bring thrir particular talents and resourccs to bear upon the production
and sharing of the benefits from the
oceans and has, thus, greatly enhanced
the aggregate base values available to,
and employed by, the general com-

lIIunity for su('h Jlurposcs. . . . the
vastness and the immense riches of the
oceans have ..• facilitated the developmcnt in high degree of joint, noncompetitive and cooperative, strategies,
characterized by a minimum of mutual
interference and deprivation. The outcomes of this inclusive, cooperative
enjoyment of the oceans, as demonstrated in recent centuries, have been
genuinely integrative-with all peoples
gaining and none losing--in an enormous production of goods and services
for all mankind. 25

Not everyone is as sanguine as McDougal and Burke as to the results of
uncontrolled, shared use of the seas.
The long list of depleted stocks of fish
provides ample evidence that at least the
living resources of the sea are not
inexhaustible. 26 Examples from non sea
areas would also suggest that the unregulated use of resources leads to waste
and in some cases exhaustion. For
example, until the first quarter of the
present century, western grazing lands
were treated as common property resources, a treatment that was initially
established because it was believed they
were inexhaustible. 27 Similarly, un-regulated exploitation of pctrolcum
resources in thc early stages of largescale usc of that resourcc resulted in
highly wastcful practices.28 And evcry
American schoolchild lcarns of thc cxtinction of thc passenger pigeoJl and
near cxtermination of the buffalo by
uncontrolled hunting.
But even assuming inexhaustibility of
resources, there is another problem with
respect to a regime of freedom of
exploitation of the seabed. The key
element of a regime which would favor
exploitation of the resources would be
assurance that the entrepreneur would
have sufficient exclusivity so that he
would have a reasonable opportunity to
recover the costs of his investment and
makc a pro fit. If thc mincral rcsollr<:cs
lire rcally so Vllst ;IS to make room for
all, thcir commercial value varics with
the composition and concentration of
nodules, their depth, and the proximity
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to operating bases and markels. 29 Thus,
there would be competition to harvest
or exploit those of the greatest cconomic value. The concentration of the
fishing fleets of many nations in the
areas of richest catches, such as the
Grand Banks of Newfoundland and the
waters around Iceland, provides an
example of the natural consequences of
such a regime.
While the process of accommodation
could work for fisheries, there is probably less chance that it would for
exploitation of seabed resources. Thc
economics of the two situations arc
quite different. Calculations based on
IVlero's studies of manganese nodule
deposits have indicated that an entrepreneur would probably require exclusive
rights to an area of at least 1,000 square
miles to make exploitation of manganese nodules economically feasible. 30
Mining or drilling into the subsoil would
be even more expensive, with an even
greater requirement for exclusivity to
make the venture potentially profitable.
The foregoing discussion of the res
communis theory has concentrated on
the resource exploitation aspect of the
problem because that would be the
activity most affected by adoption of
such a regime for the seabed and subsoil. If this theory were adopted, other
activities on the seabed could be carried
out in the same manne;:- as they are
carried out on the high seas today. Each
nation and its nationals would be free to
conduct lawful activities, subject only
to the laws of the "flag state" and to
the rights of others likewise engaged In
lawful projects.3 1 These activities-research and exploration, fishing, waste
disposal, defense activities, etc.--are inclusive rather than exclusive in nature.
They are, additionally, the types of
activities that states have traditionally
carried out on the high scas without the
nl'l'l'~.;it\" of a nation:l[ or inll'rnat iona[
juri$lliciinn owr thl' arl'a in whil'h t[lI')'
arc conducted. Controversies anll competing uses have been worked out

through :111 acco\lllllod:ltivl~ pmceHH
which, although far frolll perfect, has
generally kept the high seas free for the
lawful usc of all. Thus, activities othcr
than resource exploitation would appear
to be favored by a res communis regime
for the seabed.
If, however, the exploitation of the
seabed's resources should hecOlne the
dominant activity, interaction bctwcen
such exploitation and the other activities might have' adverse effects on the
latter. For example, drags, dredges, drill
rigs, and the like might have an adverse
effecL on the lise of the sallle area of the
seabed for defense activities or rescarch
activities, or might require restrictions
on the usc of the high scas themselves to
protect the sea bottom activity. Whether mutual accommodation could occllr
in such circumstances is conjcctural.
Obviously, in the absence of some authority over the area--either national or
international--failure of accommodation
is a distinct possibility.
A res communis regime would appear
to be advantageous to the United States
from several standpoints. Probably the
foremost is that aetivitil's conducted by
other states, no matter how extensive or
long continued, would not lead to the
establishment of claims to jurisdiction
by slIch statcs. Thus, the right of the
United Statcs to continucu IIHe of the
seabed for a wide range of current
activities would be protected. Additionally, as the leader in underwater technology, the United States has a valid
interest in preserving the availability of
the maximum area of sea bottom for
future exploitation by its nationals. A
regime which would prevent the assertion of national claims would obviously
serve this end. Once commercial exploitation of the mineral resources of the
sea bottom begins, however, a regime
which would not protect the first entrepn'lu'ur in :til IIfl'a al-(ain:;[ "l'Iailll
jUlIIlll'rs" would rrl'alt' Iilllt' it\(~I'ntiw
for imaginative and risky ventures.
From an international viewpoint, a
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regime based on the res communis
theory would probably have little attraction, particularly to the less-developed nations of the world. Just as in the
res nullius concept all of the benefits
derived from exploitation of the seabed
would flow to the technologically advanced states. The less-developed states
would receive little or no benefit from
it. Thus, this theory would probably be
unacceptable to such states.
Coastal State Jurisdiction. Under the
present state of the law, the sea's
bottom beyond the limit of the continental shelf is not subject to the claim
of any state. However, a scheme which
would vest jurisdiction in the coastal
state is one of the possible regimes
which merits consideration in any
examination of alternative regimes.
Coastal state jurisdiction has considcrable appeal. The exploitability criterion of the Continental Shelf Convention provides its natural basis. If it is
assumed that the exploitability criterion
could be extended outward beyond the
limit of the continental shelf, it would
follow, by analogy to Artiele 1 of the
Contineutal Shelf Convention,32 that as
any coastal state acquired the capahility
to exploit to a greater depth, all coastal
claims would be extended outward to
equal depth.33 Assuming the eventual
capability of exploitation of even the
deepest ocean floor, the final result
would be that the entire ocean bed
would belong to the coastal states of the
world.
Undcr the foregoing theory, the
claims of opposite coastal states would
eventually meet, which raises the question where the boundary between them
would lie. Article 6 of the Continental
Shelf Convention provides the answer:
1. Whcre the same eontincntal shclf
is adjaccnt to the territories of two or
more Slates whosc coasts arc opposite
('aeh other. the boundary of th(' continental shelf appertaining to such States
shall be dctcrmillcd by agreement between them. In the absence of agree-

menl, and unlcss anothcr boundary is
justified by spccial circumstances, the
boundary is the median linc, evcry
point of whieh is equidistant from the
nearest points of the basclines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea
of each State is measured.

Paragraph 2 of the same Article prescribes an identical formula for establishing the boundary between adjacent
states.
The principal advantage of such a
regime would be its simplicity. Although there might be some prohlems in
detcrmining exactly what is mcant hy
exploitability,34 the delincation and
administration of national claims under
this theory would be relatively simple
compared to the othcr regimes examined. Demarcation of outer boundaries would follow the isobath and
could easily be drawn on hydrographic
charts. If technology does eventually
permit exploitation to the deepest parts,
the equidistance principle provides a
workable mechanical method of drawing boundaries in the absence of an
agreement.
An appreciation of the result of a
coastal statc rcgime with boundaries
delineated in accordance with the foregoing principles can be gained by
cxamining Figure 2, which is a chart of
a portion of the North Atlantic Ocean
showing national seabed boundaries
extended to their maximum limits and
drawn in accordance with the equidistance principle. What immediately
strikes the observer is the predominant
role playcd by islands. Under thc Contincntal Shclf Convention, islands have
the same basis for claims to the seabed
and subsoil as do continental mainlands.
Although not shown in Figure 2, even
such insignificant dots as Clipperton
Island, Asccnsion Island, St. Helena
Island, Tristan de Cunha and South
(;('or~ia would serv,' as hast's for lar~c
national claims. The United States
would be able to claim vast areas of the
Pacific because of the location of the

oj:::o.

~
Figure 2.--North Atlantic Ocean with Seabed Boundaries Based on Equidistance Principle
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Hawaiian Islands. In the Atlantic, however, foreign offshore islands would be a
barrier to very extensive claims.
A regime which divided up the
seabeds according to this system would
probably be conducive to maximum
exploration and exploitation of the
natural resources of the seabed. Each
coastal state could grant the exclusive
rights which have been found to be a
necessary precondition to commercial
ventures for mining of the seabed. If the
coastal state did not care to exploit the
seabed itself-or did not have the technological capability-it could license
foreign companies and extract a royalty
income. The promise of a monetary
return to the licensing state would
probably serve as the necessary spur to
encourage rapid development of undersea resources.
Other types of activities on the seabed, however, might be severely hampered. As Dr. Wilbert Chapman has
pointed out, assertions of special purpose jurisdictions by coastal states over
areas of the high seas tend to ripen into
general jurisdictions. 35 The history of
the continental shelf claims by other
states following the Truman Proclamation in 1945 illustrates this phenomenon. Although the Truman Proclamation asserted only a special purpose
jurisdiction for the purpose of exploiting the natural resources of the shelf,
the claims asserted by a number of
other states were not so narrowly defined. In some cases they were all
inclusive, asserting full sovereignty over
the seabed, the superjacent waters, and
the airspace above them. 36 Thus, a
major drawback of a coastal state regime over the deep ocean floor would
be the possible creation of a conglomeration of "national lakes" in
which the traditional freedom of the
high seas would have shrunk to only a
shadow of its fonner sclf.
A second drawback would be the
probable opposition of the U.S.S.R. The
coastal state approach would provide

practically no gains to the U.S.S.R.
other than a small portion of the Northwest Pacific and the Barents and Arctic
Oceans. It seems unreasonable to expect
that the Soviet Union would agree to a
regime in which it gained so little and
others gained so much. Without the
agreement of the Soviet Union, it does
not seem possible that a viable regime
would result.
Finally, because the results of the
coastal state regime are so uneven in the
distribution of benefits, it appears unlikely that it could receive anything
approaching a consensus in the world
community. Inland states, of course,
would receive no benefits. States with
only short coastlines, or whose coastlines are of a concave configuration,
would generally receive little. Islands
would be the big gainers, and in many
cases they are not at all well situated,
politically, economically, or technologically, to do the best job of exploiting
the undersea resources.
In sum, therefore, although coastal
state jurisdiction has a considerable
superficial attraction, it has a number of
drawbacks which make its adoption as a
regime for the deep ocean bed lcss than
ideal.
International J urisdietion. Suggestions for the establishment of an international regime for thc deep ocean bcd
have come from a number of sourccsprivatc individuals,37 study groups and
commissions,38 government officials,39
and governments themselves. 40 Such
suggestions have varied in their details
but have generally included the following core elements:
(1) Vesting of jurisdiction over the
seabed and subsoil beyond the edge of
the continental shelf in the United
Nations or in a special international
agency;
(2) Establishment of the principle
that the seabed and subsoil beyond the
continental shelf are not subject to
appropriation by any state;
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(3) Leasing or licensing of private
exploitation of the resources of the
seabed and subsoil by the international
agency; and
(4) In several proposals, reservation
of the seabed solely for peaceful purposes.
The discussion of methods for bringing such arrangements into being is
reserved for Chapter V. The discussion
in this section considers the advantages
and disadvantages that might be anticipatcd from such a regime.
The Commission to Study the
Organization of Peace, the rescarch affiliate of the United Nations Association
of the United States, which is one of the
proponents of an international jurisdiction for the ocean's floor, lists six
principal advantages which it says will
flow from such a regime. They are:
(I) I t would avoid controversy
among nations arising from conflicting
claims to, and appropriative uses of, the
uncommitted areas of the earth;
(2) It would insure the economically
most effective use of the natural resources of the sea;

(3) It would prevent military use of
the seabed;
(4) It would avoid contamination of
the seas;

(5) It would insure that all nations
would profit by the opportunities and
potential resources; and
(6) It would provide the United Nations with an independent source of
income (from licensing and registration
fees).41
The foregoing list of advantagcs
sccms to include all of the important
ones claimcd by thc other proponents
of an international rr~inll'. Thc t'mpha·
sis /-,rivcn to one or anot her ha$ vllrird
considerably, however. The propo$al of
Malta at the 22nd session of the General
Assemhly put primary emphasis on the

nccessity of prevcnting the uLilization of
the seabed for military purposes and on
the henefit which the United Nations
would derive from the income received,
which, in turn, could be used for the
benefit of the developing nations. 42
Senator Pell gives primacy to the need
to provide for order to foster rapid
technological breakthrough which he
believes is imminent. 43 Quincy Wright
assigns equal weight to the promotion
of world peace, efficient exploitation,
and equitable opportunity among
nations. 44
The resolution of the Government of
l\lalta at the 22nd General Assembly
provoked a flurry of interest in the U.S.
Congress in the fall of 1967. Fifteen
resolutions were introduced in the
House of Representatives in opposition
to vesting title to the ocean floor in the
United Nations.45 In the Senate three
resolutions were introduced, one opposing an international regime and two
favoring it.46 Committees in both
Houses have held hearings on the subject, at which the proponents and
opponents were heard. The primary
objection of the opponents was not
substantive but procedural. Both
governmental and nongovernmental
witnesses asserted that knowledge about
the ocean depths was at present too
primitive lind incompletc to I'crlllillldvocacy of any substantive rcgime for the
deep ocean bed. The spokcsman for the
Department of State, for example,
stated:
All of us in a sense arc groping in an
area in which not much has becn donc.
We are certainly unclear as to the
possibilitics economically. We surcly
don't know as yet preeiscly what the
security implications are. There is so
much work to bc done that it would
clearly bc a mistake to procccd to
devclop conclusions at this time. 47

Tht' ,\$$it;tllnt Sl'l'rt'l:lry of Intl'rior
thc position of hi$ I)l'plIl'lnlC'nl
thus:
~taled

Thc Dcpartmcnt recognizes that the
United Nations is a ~'Iilable forum for
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development of international law for
use of the oceans' resources. We believe
that in the present state of our knowledge of the resource of the deep-sea
bed and the problems that may be
involved it is premature to consider
international control over these resources, and for that reason we do not
support the treaty as proposed by
Malta. 48

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
representing the Department of Defense, staled:
.•• it is much too early in our knowledge and understanding of the nature
of deep ocean resources allli of the
technology that will be required to
exploit them for us to consider major
legal questions regarding its exploitation and ownership, certainly too early
for us to think that we would know
what we were doing if we were to take
action to vest control of ocean resources in an international body in a
specific way.49

The representatives of the Executive
Braneh of the Government, who raised
objections on the basis of prematurity,
refused to suggest any alternative regimes which the Government might
support. Some of the Congressional and
private witnesses, however, in addition
to echoing the doubts expressed by
administration witnesses, did point out
what they believed were substantive
objections to an international regime.
(1) Intcrnationalization of the deep
ocean bed would amount to a giveaway
of United States rcsources;50
(2) Nations are capable of working
out sharcd use arrangements and resolving any disagreements by mutual accommodation without the necessity of an
international body assuming jurisdict1on;51 and

(3) An international administcring
agency with its attendant bureaucracy
would retard technological progress in
exploration and exploitation of thc seabcd. 52
In cxamining thc various claimcd
advantages and ohjections to an interna-

tiona! regime, it is important to recognize, first, that the objection of prematurity, which is the one most frequently raised, is not an objection to an
international regime per se_ Rather, it is
an expression of a governmental position that it is too early for the United
States to take a firm position on any
rcgime for the deep seabed. The reason
it appeared to be an objection to internationalization was that it was the Malta
proposal for an international regime
which occasioned the debate on the
subject. Thus, insofar as this is an
objcction to internationalization, it is
also an objection to any of the alternative regimes which have been discussed.
With respect to the advantages
claimed for an international jurisdiction,
it is important to recognize that some of
them presuppose the acceptance by the
world community of the principles
advocated. For example, the claim that
an international regime would prevent
military use of the seabed assumes
agreement on making the seabed a
weapon-free area. Yet, in the U_N.
debates on the [\lalta resolution, the
United States and U.S.S.R. indicated
coolness to this aspect of the proposition, seemingly expressing a preference
for treating this aspect within the overall framework of disarmament rather
than in connection with a discussion of
the oceans. 53 It is obvious that any
regime which did not obtain the concurrence of these two superpowers
would be meaningless.
Apart from this caveat, it should be
pointed out that an international regime
does offer genuine advantages. An international licensing and rulemaking body
could promote the orderly exploration
and exploitation of the ocean floor. The
objection that an international agency
would be an obstacle to such exploration and exploitation is cOl~ecturaL The
history of international administration
in snch fields as dvil aviation, telecommunications, postal affairs, and
other functional maLLcrs within the
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competence of the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations and the
specialized agencies is one of generally
harmonious and fruitful progress. In the
case of exploitation of seabed resources,
there would be the added incentive that
the U.N. agency would be deriving an
independent income from its grants of
exploitative rights--an arrangement
which would be conducive to establishing simple and expeditious procedures
for granting such rights.
The idea that an international regime
would insure that all nations draw benefits may be overoptimistic. Although an
in~ependent income for the United Nations would be of indirect value to all
nations, those that would profit most,
by being involved in the actual exploitative operations, would probably be the
same nations that would be involved in
such operations under any possible regime, i.e., those with the technological
and financial resources to embark on
the expensive programs involved. Even
for them, the day when any large-scale
profits are derived may still be some
distance into the future.
As far as U.S. interests are concerned, the allegations that the adoption
of an international regime would be a
"giveaway" appear to be overstated.
Since at the present time no nation has
a valid claim to the seabed bcyond the
continental shelf, the United States, in
agreeing to international jurisdiction
over the seabed, would not be giving
away any of its rights. Furthermore, as
the most advanced nation in undersea
technology, the United States and its
citizens would find a leading role in the
exploitation of the deep ocean under
any of the alternative regimes. Assuming
that any jurisdiction vested in an international body would be no more extensive than that currently exercised by
coastal states over the continental shelf
--i.e., sovereib'11 rights to explore and
exploit the natural resources--activities
not interfering with exploitative activities would not be hampered and could

be carried on by any nation with essentially the same freedom as exists today.
As a final comment on this rebrime, it
appears that, despite the apparent unwillingness of subordinate U.S. officials
to commit themselves in any specific
way except that much more work must
be done before the United States can
take a position, a 1966 statement by the
President indicates a marked leaning in
the direction of an international regime.
In an address at the commissioning of
the oceanographic research ship Oceanographer on 13 July 1966, hc stated:
.•• under no circumstances, we belicve, must we ever allow the prospects
of rich harvest and mineral wealth to
create a new form of colonial compctition among the maritime nations. We
must be careful to avoid a race to grab
and to hold the lands under the high
seas. We must ensure that the deep seas
and the ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human
beings. 54

In his statement before the First
Committee of the General Assembly on
November 8, 1967, Ambassador Goldberg quoted the Prcsident's statement
alld then addcd:
This mcans, in our vicw, tha t the
deep ocean floor should not be a stagc
for competing claims of national sovereignty. Whatever legal regime for the
usc of thc deep ocean floor lIIay
eventually be :I/,'Teed upon, it should
ensure that the decp ocean will be
open to exploration and use by all
states, without discrimination. 55

Thus, although only a bare framework has been traced out, the United
States appears to have committed itself
to the principle of ruling out purely
national claims to portions of the seabed.
Summary. The four bases for a regime of the ocean bottom which have
been examined do not exhaust all of the
possihlc bascs for sllch a regimc. An
entirely novel approach might bc adopted--or perhaps a composite regime incorporating features of one or more of
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the several jurisdictional models discussed. For example, therc might be a
possihility of a regime which would
recognize national claims to the seabed
but establish an international agency or
mechanism for recording of claims and
settlement of disputes. The four regimes, however, embrace the best defined models within the range of possible jurisdictional arrangements. The
res nullius and coastal state approaches
would lead to national jurisdiction over
segments of the seahed; the international approach would lead to an inter-

national body having jurisdiction of
sorts; the res communis approach would
not vest jurisdiction over the seabed per
se but would lead to control of seabed
activities by the "flag state" of the
vessel or structure. By focusing on the
four approaches it has been possible to
examine the full range of jurisdictional
problems in relation to the various
activities foreseen for the ocean floor_
As has been seen, each model has
certain advantages and is accompanied
by certain drawbacks. Table I summarizes the results of that examination.

Table 1.--5ummary of Jurisdictional Model Examination
Jurisdictional Models

Contexts
(A)

(B)

Res
Nullius

Coastal
State
Juris.

Internat.
Juris.

+

+

Type of activity
Exploitation of
natural resources

+

Exploration and
research

+

+

+

Defense
activities

+

+

7a

Disposal of
wastes

+

+

Advantage to
United States

+

+

]3

Advantage to
U.S.S.R.

?

+

7a

+

7a

Other Important
aspects

Acceptability to
developing nations
Enhancement of
orderly relations
between states
Key:

Res
Communis

±.b

+

+

+ = favorable
- = unfavorable
7= unknown or conjectural

!!Whether favorable or unfavorable would depend on nature of the
international regime.
bprobably acceptable to those with extensive coastlines and to island
states; probably unacceptable to others.
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V-ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES
FOR ESTABLISHING A
LEGAL REGIME
Having examined the alternative regimes that might be applied to the
seabed and subsoil of the deep ocean
beyond the limits of the continental
shelf, it is appropriate to examine the
procedural means by which a regime
might be brought into being. It will he
the purpose of this chaper to consider
several of these procedures, primarily
from the viewpoint of actions open to
the United States.
The procedure which has received
the most public notice in recent months
is the negotiation of an international
multilateral treaty for the ocean floor
under the auspices of the United Nations. This was the approach suggested
by the Government of Malta in its
proposal in the 22nd General Assembly
of the United Nations. A second approach might be based on a unilateral
proclamation by the United States asserting a claim to certain rights, in a
manner similar to the Truman Proclamation on the continental shelf. or proclaiming U.S. adhercnce to some otht'r
principle. A third approach could be
dubbed the "wait and see" method.!
Negotiation of an International
Treaty. I\losL of the sugp;csLions for
negoLiation of a mulLilateral treaLy Lo
establish a seabed regime have been
coupled with the proposal that the
treaty should also establish the jurisdiction of an international body over the
seabed and subsoil. The policy of seeking a treaty, however, need not necessarily lead to a parLieular type of
regime. The Continental Shelf Convention, which created national jurisdiction
over portions of the seabed, resulted
from an international conference. The
High Seas Convention, which confirmed
the principle of frerdolll of the hip;h sras
for the usc of all naLions, n'sulLcd from
the same international confercnce. As
will he seen below, however, the mellns

adopLed for creaLing a legal rcgime Illay
have some influence on the nature of
the regime which results.
The precedenLs mosL frequently ciLed
for an ocean bed trcaLy are the treaties
governing Antarctica2 and outer space,3
particularly the laUer. Those who urge
early negotiaLions for a treaLy on thc
ocean bed see an analo!:,'Y between Lhe
situations which confronted the world's
decision makers in dealing wiLh the issue
of compcting claims and uses of ouLcr
space and Antarctica and what has
sometimes been callcd "iJllwr space. "·t
They poinL out thaL by, siLLing down
togeLher around a confercnce table, Lhe
nations of the world were able to
remove these vexing problems from the
arena of internaLional competition and
create a basis for peaceful cooperaLion
among nations. Whether these two
treaties did, in fact, accomplish as much
as has been claimed for them is somewhat open to question.? Nevertheless,
assuming arguendo, that the two treaties
did settle troublesome problems, the
situational similariLies between the seabed and these other two environments
are not necessllriIy so gn'at as to snl!gl':;L
that the same procedure would he
cqually applicable to il. Perhaps the
most significant distinction is the difference in the world community's percepLion liS Lo tlw vlllue of tlu: sJllIeell
involved. In the cases of Antarctica and
ouLer space, only the prospect of gaining scientific knowledge was involved;
not of that productive use or economic
gain from their exploitation.6 On the
other hand, there is a general belief
among those who advocate negotiation
of an ocean floor treaty now that there
are vast riches on the deep ocean floor
merely waiting for the enterprising
businessman.7 Although this belief is
probably greatly overoptimistic (at least
for the ncar term), it pervades thc
disl'ussitlll of tl\{\ suhjeet 1II111 provilh,s
one of the sip;nifit'lllll imp u\s!!s for Lhtl
drive toward ne~otiaLion.
A second imporLant distinction is Lhc
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differing knowlcdgc of thc environmcnts involvcd. In comparison to more
hospitable land areas of the world,
man's knowledge of the Antarctic is
limited. Yet many nations have carried
out extensive exploration and research
there for several decades,8 apparently of
sufficient scope and depth to assure the
nations principally concerned that they
would not subject their interests to very
severe risks by putting the issue to an
international negotiation. 9 With respect
to outer space, despite the fact that
man's explorations really began only
about a decade ago, the intensity of the
effort during that decade has likewise
created a vast amount of knowledge. In
addition, during this short period, a
considcrable hotly of international preeedcnt had already been built up renecting the degree of mutual tolerance
of inclusive uses of space which the
pr1ndpal powers would accept. U.S.
Amhassador to the United Nations
Arthur Goldberg has stated that the
U.N. sponsored treaty on outer space
cvolved from a pcrception of common
interests "_ .. on the basis of experience ... [which gradually crystallized into binding rules of law. "10 But
he also suggested that" ... both cOILntries resisted the injection of qILestions
which, though important and 10brically
related to the agreed principles, were
not ripe for international negotiation--such as the delimitation of outer
space and the exploitation of resources
on celestial bodies. "11
In agreement with the testimony of
U.S. officials in Congressional hearings
discussed in Chapter IV, the status of
the deep seabed may be more analogous
to those issues referred to by Ambassador Goldberg as "not ripe for international negotiation" than to those which
were eovered in the Outer Space Treaty.
In a more general vein, Ambassador
Arthur II. Dean, sJleaking from his
cxpericnce as the chief U.S. ddcgalt~ at
a number of important international
confcrences, including the 1958 and

jI)()!) lI.N. Law (If thl! Sca Confercnces
and sevcral years as the chief U.S.
disarmamcnt negotiator, has stated:

There is an understandable reluctance on the part of national governments to enter into agreements with
other countries binding them irrevocably to future action or inaction.
Circumstances, science, and technology
change, and nations should not always
assume obligations into the indefinite
future for better or for worse. As a
general rule, therefore, most nations
prefer to work out ad hoc arrangements with other countries rather than
to enter into formal agreements which
may prove unduly restrictive in the
light of later knowledge.
This natural inclination to avoid any
rigid treaty is especially pronounced
whcn the dimensions of the subject
matler of a potential trcaty arc relatively unknown and, accordingly,
where the eventual effect of agreement
can least be gauged. When the activity
sought to be regulated by treaty has
just commenced, so that customs and
practices with respect to it have not
crystallized, treaties-which draw much
of their text and support from customs
and practice-will seldom be found,12

All that Ambassadors Goldbcrg and
Dean hU\'c said applies in full measurc to
the current state of knowledge of the
deep seabed. Neverthcless, the pressure
for some sort of U.N. action was apparently so great at the 221)(1 Gencral
Assembly that til(! major I)()w(~rs )lUd to
go at least part way toward meeting this
dcmand by agreeing to a resolution
calling for the formation of a 35 nation
ad hoe committee to study the scope
and various aspects of the Malta proposal; to undertake a survey of past
activities of the United Nations and
other international agencics in the field
and to prepare an account on all aspects
of thc question. The ResoluLion also
called on the ad hoe committee to study
means for promotion of international
cooperation and submit a report to the
2~Jrd session of thc Geneml Asscm lIly,13
Thc Resolution passed by the 22nd
Gcneral Assembly has the familiar ring
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of the early history of U.N. action
which ultimately led to the adoption of
the Outer Space Treaty of 1966. Initial
action within the United Nations on
that subject was the establishment in
1958 of an ad hoc committee to study
the peaceful use of outer space. A year
later an enlarged Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was
created. This Committec worked
through the early sixties with few concrete results.1 4 By 1966, however,
experience had demonstrated that there
was an area of common interest between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. which
could form the basis for an outer space
treaty.l5 Thus, in 1966-year 9 of the
space age--upon the initiative of the
United States and the U.S.S.R., a treaty
was rapidly negotiated under the auspices of the Committee, resulting in the
laying of a drl\ft text before the General
Assembly in December of that year.l 6
The Treaty was signed by 60 nations at
a White House ceremony on 27 January
1967)7
Although thc United Nations has
taken only the first tentative step in the
same direction with respect to thc sea
floor, it is not inconceivable to visualize
a similar outcome a few years hence.
Unilateral Declaration_ The outcomes
of particular international issues are
frequently powerfully influenced by the
initial positions asserted by or on behalf
of a single prominent state. Grotius'
freedom of the seas doctrine, which was
in reality a plea for freedom of navigation and fishing for Dutch vessels
against the claims of more powerful
European nations to exclusive jurisdiction over vast areas of the sea, had a
marked influence on the development
of the law of the sea.l 8 In more recent
times, the rapid development of the
contint'nlal shelf doctrine was, as has
IWl'n Sl'l'll, llll' tlirl'l'l rt'"u!t of I'rl'Sitll~ul
Truman's 19·1·;' I'rlldanmlillll.
Several factors can affect the influence which a single national statement

of position can have,. I'rofessor William
T. Burke has pointed out that the
timing of a statc's initial claim is often
as important as its substantive content
in determining the influence it will have.
lie suggests that one reason the Truman
Proclamation had as much influence as
it did was that it was made at a time
when the world community was at the
threshold of activities on the Continental Shelf. At that time, practices and
claims inconsistent with the asserted
U.S. position had not yet had a chance
to develop. Burke suggests that we arc
today in essentially the same threshold
position with respect to the resources of
the sea floor and that an assertion of
~ational position by the United States
would have considerable influence over
the future development of the law. The
fact that the U.S. technological lead will
probably result in U.S. nationals being
the first to exploit the surficial deposits
of the seabed will, in his view, enhance
the influence which the United States
could exercise by a unilatcral assertion
of position.l 9
The substantive position taken by a
state obviously has an effect on the
influence which the unilateral assertion
of position will have. Professor Burke
points out that claims to exclusive uses
have gained more general assent than
have those in which restraint was c:xercised. 20 Experience over the past 2
decades with respect to territorial sea
claims provides evidence of the trend
toward broader, exclusive claims. Not
only have many of the older states
extended their territorial sea claims to
12 miles or beyond, but most claims of
the newly emerging states have been for
12 miles or beyond. 21 The Geographer
of the State Department, G. Etzel
Pearcy, has suggested that the basic
impetus for this trend is nationalism:
(;mwin~ nalionalisll\
rr'l\I~hl wilh IC'II~inIlS OIls"

in a world
l':IU$l'S lIIallY
nalillll$ 10 looJ... seawarcl, wi IC' Ii Il'r
a pprchcnsivc as to securing their domain or to extending it. In fact, strong
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nationalism by its very nature serves as
the ineipicnt forerunner to offshore
c1aims-.always incrcasing, ncvcr dc·
creasing. Not uncommonly a statc will
make greater offshore claims in re·
sponse to similar claims on the part of
a neighbo.ring state.
The emergence of 54 newly inde·
pendent states since December 1945,
each with a fresh consciousness as to
its national domain, has accentuated
attention given to sovereign territory
and its bounds. 22

Even where the claim is not for an
exclusive usc, the advantage of having,
in effect, preempted the field gives the
initial claimant an inherent advantage.
On this point, ProCessor Burke states:
To be sure, .past experience has been
that restraint in assertion of claim has
not prevented others from making
extravagant demands. Nonethcless, it
merits emphasis that these demands,
though still not wholly effectively re·
futed, have never commanded wide
assent and, indeed, have been eategori·
cally rejected by most states. At the
very least, it seems evident that the
United States could, by suitably
limited claim or announccd position,
promote policics directed at maxi·
mizing inclusive bcncfit from thc vast
storehouses of rcsources in and undcr
the sca. 23

It would appear from the foregoing
that iC a unilateral proclamation by the
United States were to have decisive
influence, it would be important that it
be made prior to the time that activities
on the seabed reached such a stage that
other states fclt that their national
interests requircd them to assert inconsistent national claims. It would appear
to be particularly important that
prompt action be taken by the United
States in the event that the position
eventually opted for is some sort of
inclusive regime allowing access by all
states to the seabed rather than an
exclusive national claim. As Pearcy has
aptly put it, offshore cluims, once usserted, arc "alwuys incrl~asing, never
dccreasing." It seenlS evident that had
the Truman Proclamation in 1945

amountcd to a rCllunciation of national
jurisdiction over the continental shelf
rathcr than an assertion oC a claim of
national jurisdiction, it would not have
gained the immediate acceptance it did
reccive. Therefore, the less selfish and
exclusive the asserted position, the
greater is the need for early and decisive
action.
An obstacle to prompt action by the
United States is the currently poor
perception of what type of regime
would forward national interests in view
of the lack of knowledge about the sea
floor environment and its possible future uses. 24 Intensive study is underway
within the Government to attempt to
resolve this matter, and it has been given
added urgency by the approval of Resolution No. 2340 by the 22nd General
Assembly.25 But whethcr the study
results will be available in time to enable
the United States to take the initiative is
uncertain.
The United States appeared to be
about to take the first step toward a
unilateral announcement of position in
1966, when the President spoke at the
commissioning of the oceano~aphic
research vessel Oceanographer. 20 That
statement has not, however, been followed up with further action. It may
have been a trial balloon, although
Amhassador Goldherg IIuoted it in the
U.N. debute in the fall of 1967 and
other U.S. spokesmen have continued to
repeat it as the current U.S. position. 27
Additionally, it would appear to have
been watered down by subsequent statements by official U.S. spokesmen who
have asserted the need for further study
before the United States can take an
official position. Thus, although in 1966
the United States appeared to be on the
brink of announcement of a unilateral
position which would have done much
towurd shaping u regime for thc decp
sl'a floor, its position is now amhiguous.
.I udging by the intense interest which
has been generated in the international
community by the Malta proposal at the
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22nd General Assembly and by discussion taking placc in other forums, the
time left to the Unitcd States to exercise its initiative may be running out.
Wait and See. For those who assert
that we do not yet ha\'e enough information about the deep ocean floor and
its possible uses, the obvious means of
arriving at a regime for the seabed is on
a ease-by-ease basis as man builds up
experience in the environment. The
argument in favor of this approach is
not only that it is the pragmatic way of
approaching any problem, but also the
way in which the bulk of the law of the
sea has been crcated over the centuries-each use or claim by one state being
either acceded to or resisted by others
in the international community, the
process of action and reaction gradually
creating a body of precedents which
harden into the status of law. 28 The
Judge Advocate General ofthe Navy has
recently stated that the lesson of centuries of legal history is that "law cannot
be prefabricated in abstract codification. "29
Perhaps the most ardent advocate of
letting the regime of the seabed develop
by custom is Professor Myres McDougal.
At the 1967 Law of the Sea Institute at
the University of Rhode Island, at
which he delivered the opening paper,
he stated:
Another obvious feature [of the
international decisioilmaking process]
(and this accounts for my animus
against conferences) is that historically
most international law has been madc
by eustom--by people creating expectations in each other about the requirements for future decision by simply
co-operating or engaging in collaborative activities. Such co-operation
creates expectations about the uniformities in decision that are expected
and required. The great bulk of our
inhcritt'd prescriptions in the law of
tht' S('a had t111'ir oril!in in this way. and
when th,' l'ollllllllnily ;Il'hi,',"'~ It'/.<i$iatiVI' prescription of this kind ther<' is
sollie guarantee of its rationality. That
the sallle persons-nation-state officials

--must be hoth (~hiln;lIIts :I[.:ainst the
community and ded.;ion-makers offers
some safeguard against exaggerated,
inrIa ted claims. If what I elaim I must
concede to you, and if I am, in turn, a
judge as we)) as a claimant, there is, the
history of the law of the sea suggests, a
chance to clarify common interest. In
the present posture of world affairs,
when a great confcrcnce is called and
the representatives of the statcs gather
around the table, they come with all
their perspectives, with instructions
about the total policies of their states,
the policies that relate not only to the
law of the sea but to other things.
... There are so many intrusions of
considcrations that have no relation to
thc law of thc sea that cven the people
who are most eompctcnt to makl! thc
law of the sea are not allowed to do so.
Hence, until we can, by traditional
customary process, secure a greater
consensus, a greater degree of clarity
about what the common interests of
peoples of the world are in relation to
the important contemporary problems
in the public order of the oceans, I
think we should go very slow in encouraging a call for more conferences. 30

Obviously, if this step-by-step method of proceeding could be achieved, it
would be the most desirable way of
proceeding. Unfortunately, there are
several difficulties which would be encountered in accomplishing it. The first
is that it reflects an essentially European
and American conecpt of intemational
law which the newly emerged stutes
regard as designed to protect and defend
strong and privileged position. It necessarily assumes that law will be created
by the practices of those nations advanced and strong enough to carry out
activities in the particular environment
involved. The rapid decolonization of
the world and the increasing weight of
the new states in international affairs--at
least at the U.N. General Assembly-create a substantial doubt that the
Ir:ulilional prol'l'~$ ean funclion as it did
ill till' pa':I.:11 Thl' 11}5B :lI1l1 1%0 I.aw
of IIIl' :-;,'a Con rl'rI'IIl'I'': prm'itll' :;IH'l'ifil'
examples of Ihl~ rclul'lance of Ihe new
states to be bound by traditional prin-
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ciples crealed by the colonial powers
hcforc thcy werc cvcn in existenee. 32
The second difficulty is that a "wait
and sec" approach would probably lead
toward ex elusive claims by states, thus
forfciting any chancc for the adoption
of any other type of regime (such as
sharcd usc or an international rcgime).
This rcsult follows partly from the
impctus of nationalism, as discussed
abovc, and partly from thc currcntly
opcn·cmlcd definition of the contincnL11 shelf. 3 3 The effcets of the lattcr
principle arc already being felt, at leusL
in United Slales practice. The I )cpartment of Intcrior has issucd five oil leases
for cxploitation of areas off the Pacific
coast of thc Unitcd Statcs which are
bcyond thc 200 mctcr depth of thc
Contincntal Shelf Convention, thus
bringing into play the second criterion
of that Convcntion-·exploitability.
Thcse arcas arc from 12 to 32 miles
from shorc and at watcr dcpths up to
1,500 feet. 34 A lcasc for sea floor
phosphatc nodule mining somc 40 miles
off thc California coast in water depths
to 4,000 feet has also been granted. 35
Additionally, as early as 1961. the
Associate Solicitor, Division of Puhlie
Lands, Dcpartmcnt of Interior, stated
thc opinion that by ratifying the Continental Shelf Convention, thc Unitell
Sllltl~ had " ... lIsserted rights to the
scahed and subsoil as far seaward as
exploitlltion is possiblc. "36 As other
states sce opportunities for possible
profit in such leases, thcy too will be
quick to follow the U.S. examplc. And
what the United Slates claims for itsclf,
it must be prcpared to recognize on a
rcciprocal basis when claimed by other
nations.
Slill a third difficulty, one which has
already bcen touched upon, is the
strong impetus, both within and outside
the United States, for international
cooperation in tlw esLlIhlishment of 1I
n'~ime now, while the world is lit lhe
threshold of profitable exploitation of
the decp sca floor and before a new

form of "colonial exploitation" is
touched off. The resolutions of a number of committees and commissions
calling for such action have been mentioned in Chapters I and IV. Additionally, the U.N. debate on the Malta
rcsolution in the fall of 1967 showed a
broad consensus in favor of the United
Nations assuming jurisdiction of the
problem under broad terms of rcference. 37 In opposition to this position,
official U.S. spokesmen have asserted
that knowledgc of the sca floor cnvironment and U.S. interests therein lire
insufficiently known to permit the
United States to take a position on a
regime for the sea floor. That position is
in remarkable parallel with the position
taken by the U.S. Government with
respect to a regime for outer space in
the early years of the space age. For
example, in 1958 the Legal Adviser of
the Department of State testified before
a Senate Committee that:
•.. we are inclined to view with great
reserve any such suggestions as that the
principles of the law of space should be
codified ... Ulltil we ascertaill mally
more facts wilh respect to eOllditiol~
ill space. Basieall y. it is the posi tiOIl of
our Government that the law of space
should be based upon the facts of
space and that there is very much more
Ihan we have to Ir:arn ahollllhe eondi.
tions (:xislillg ill spm:t: hdort: WI: shall
be able to say what shaU be Ihe legal
principles applicable thereto. 3S

Nonetheless, only a little over 8 years
later, the United States was not only a
signatory, but also a prime advocate, of
a treaty which codified a great number
of legal rules applicable to outer space
and the uses thereof, although, admittedly, it did not attemp t to deal with
issues " ... not ripe for international
negotiation. "39
The U.N. Resolution may have sct in
motion a similar pattern of action for
tilt' law of the 131:11 floor. Thilt IlIw lhuB
lIIay not be allowed the luxury of a
leisurely, step-by-step developmcnt such
as marked the creation of international
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law in other areas in carlicr ccnturies.
From Presidcnt Truman's Contincntal
Shelf Proclamation in 1945, only 13
years clapsed until an international con·
ference adopted the Continental Shelf
Convention in 1958. With respect to
outer space, the pace was even faster-less than 10 years from the birth of the
space age in 1957 to the signing of the
Outer Space Treaty in 1967. Even less
time may be available for "inner space."

influence on such activities. Most scabcd
activities to date have been confined to
the Continental Shclf. Those fewactivities which have bccn conducted in the
deep ocean floor have not gencrally
been of the type which have resulted in
competitive assertions of exclusive
rights or claims to jurisdiction. As man's
activities on the deep ocean floor increase, however, the question of jurisdiction will become more important.

Summary. As has been seen with
respect to outer space, a "wait and see"
approach to the establishment of a legal
regime eventually developed into the
negoti.ation of a treaty embracing those
elements where a consensus had developed and where the two major
powers recognized it was in their mutual
interest to accept mutual restraints. 40
Contrary to what might have been
anticipated frodt earlier development of
international law by custom and practice of states, this process did not
occupy a very long period from first
orbiting space vehicle to treaty signing.
Although the Continental Shelf Doctrine started out on a different procedural path--unilateral dcclaration--the
ultimate result was also a treaty and in
almost as rapid a sequence. If deep sea
technology progresses as fast as space
technology--and as fast as its practitioners predict--the period between first
action and final treaty signing may be
even further compressed in the case of a
regime for the deep seabed. Thus, the
options on a method of proceeding will
~apidly narrow.

The Possible Drift Toward Coastal
State Jurisdiction. The development
which would probably create the greatest pressure for a resolution of the issue
of jurisdiction would be the opportunity or need for mining the surface
mineral deposits of the deep ocean
floor. Because an entrepreneur must be
assured sufficient rights to allow him to
recover investment costs and gain a
reasonable profit, the establishment of
some system of jurisdiction is concomitant to exploitation.! In theory it
should make little difference to the
entrepreneur whether his rights flow
from a national or an international
body, his primary interest being in the
scope of the rights granted. In actuality,
however, a businessman is accustomed
to operate under national jurisdiction.
The undersea mining entrcprenCllr,
thcreforc, will instinctively seck a national rather than an international sponsorship for his operating rights. 2 This in
turn will cause him to influence coastal
states toward assertion of claims to the
natural resources in the areas in which
he seeks to operate.
We have seen that nationalism already creates an inclination for states to
cx tcnd thcir exclusive claims farther and
farthcr to sea} When this natura! I'fl!disposition is reinforced by a prospect
of monetary gain, thc likcly result is an
extension outward of coastal state jurisdidiou unc\c'r the authority of Ihc' Contini'uta! Shelf Couvl'ntion. T!w O!"'IWC!
definition of the shelf in that Convention provides the opportunity for such

VI--CONCLUSIONS
The explosion of undcrsea technology has placed man near the threshold of greatly increased activitics on the
seabed of the decp ocean. Until the
present time. the natllfl~ and extl'nt of
those activities have heen :;lIch that the
answer to the question, "Whose is the
ocean floor?" has not had a very great

491
seaward creep of tl((: OIlter boundary.
Once hegun, the trend would be difficult to reverse:1- The uiLima te result
might be the division of the seahed
among coastal states as discussed in
Chapter I V. While such a rel,rime might
he beneficial fwm the point of view of
the development of natural resources, it
would pose serious dangers to the freedom of the high seas and to other uses
of the seahed and superjacent watcrs. As
coastal state claims to limited jurisdictions over segments of the high seas
tend to ripen into more extensive jurisdictional claims, sometimes going as far
as full sovereignty,5 a regime based on
coastal staLe jurisdiction, it is submitted,
poses a threat to the freedom of the seas
and is not a proper hasis for a regime for
the deep seabed.
If that proposition is accepted, it
would logically follow that a "wait and
sce" approach, as currently advocated
by spokesmen of the U.S. Government,
would also be unaccepLahle, since it
carries the danger of allowing a drift in
the direction of coastal state jurisdiction. According to information provided
to a Suhcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Conl1l1ittee, 15 nations have
already licensed mining operalions beyond the 200 meter depLh.6 The U.S.
Department of Interior, in I,rranting oil
and mineral leases to ocean floor areas
heyond thc 200 llIeter depth, has reinforced this trend.7 Thus, a "wait and
scc" approach, in acldition to being
sOlllewhat impracticable in thc light of
the U.N. action already initiated, would
be contrary to the concept of freedom
of thc seas and would not forward basic
U.S. intcrests.
Un acceptability of Res NuIlius and
Res Communis Theories. A rebrime
hased on the res nrLiliILs concept has
been found to provide a generally favorahle climate for all the types of sealled
activities considered in Chaptl:r IV.
Thew arc:, howl:ver, practical difficulties
in applying the gc:nerally aeecpted "cf-

fective occupation" Lest to the sealled
(which would he required hy this doctrine);B moreover, this sysLem would be
unacceptable to the developing states, as
debate before the First Commillee of
the (;elleral Assemhly ill the fall of
1967 has revealed.9
In an earlier day when international
law was shaped almost exclusively by
the practices of the dominant powers,
this would not have been an obstacle to
clevclopment of the law along these
lines.l O Today, however. the views of
the smaller, less-developed staLes cannot
he ignored. This is particularly true in
the present case, hecause the U.N.
General Assembly has already become
deeply involved in the problem. The
sheer number of the smaller states in
that hody gives them a significant influence on the outcome of issues there.
Ten of the 35 memhers of the Ad /Joc
Committee have gained their statehood
since World \\' ar II. Thus. a rel,rime based
on the res nulliILs theory seems beyond
attainment even if it were the desire of
the United States and other major
powers to seck such a regime.
The res communis concept has also
been found to provide a favorable climate for a numher of types of seabed
activities, but the fact that it cannot
offer the exclusive ri~hts required for
mineral resource development makes it
an unattractive option. [n addiLion, it
suffers from the same unattractiveness
to underdeveloped states as the res
nullius concept, and it too would appear
to he unaUainable in today's internatio nal cHma te.
The Remaining Altematives. Of the
hypothetical regillies examined, only
one emerges as :t practical alternative to
the unaeceptahle coastal state regime.
That is some sort of international jurisdiction. In view of the dangers of the
"wait and sec" approach, the alternative
methods availahle for arriving at such a
n:gimc: appl:ar to hi: unilateral proclamation and internationallll!gotiation.
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The events in the United Nations in
the fall of 1967 have narrowed the
options available to the United States
even farther. Having sponsored the idea
of an Ad Hoc Committee to examine all
aspects of the Malta proposal, it is now
committed to the support of the efforts
of that Committee)1 Under those circums~ances, it would appear that any
~ssertIons of U.S. position at this time
would have to be within the framework
of the Ad Hoc Committee. In essence
then, the course open to the United
States is to take the lead in the discussions within the Ad Hoc Committee to
develop a regime which is in the U.S.
interest. The obstacle to accomplishment of this course of action is the
officially asserted position that the
United States is not yet prepared to
take an official stand on the legal status
of the seabed because of the primitive
state of knowledge about the environment and the poorly perceived national
interest therein. It is submitted, however, that if the United States is to have
a decisive influence on the work of the
Committee and the regime which may
result from its work, it must formulate a
positiv.e national .position rapidly.
O~h~rwlse, events will pass it by, permltlmg only reaction to proposals put
forward by other states rather than
taking the lead.
It is further submilled that the
United States is not in such a state of
~gnoran.ce .as to prevent it from perceivmg baSIC mterests' and guiding the proceedings in a direction which will protect those interests. Man's knowledge
need not be perfect to permit him to
anticipate needs and provide a basic
framework of rules to govern relationships that may exist. Obviously, the lcss
perfect the knowledge, the more flexible the framework must be. In this
connection, it is appropriate to ask how
milch was known ahout the continental
shelf lit the timc of the 19·~5 'J'rullllln
Proclamation. The answer seems to be
"Not really very much." The pres~

release which aceompanicd that Proelamation stated:
Petroleum geologists bcliclJc that
portions of the Continental Shelf beyond the three-mile limit contain
valuable oil deposits. Thc study of
subsurface structurcs associated with
oil deposits which have been discovered along the Gulf Coast of Texas,
~or instan.ee, indicates that eorrespondmg depOSits may underlie the offshore
or submerged land. The trend of oil·
productive salt domes extends directly
1I1to the Gulf of Mexico off the Texas
Coast. 12

Similarly, Secretary of Interior Harold
L. Ickes, in an interview a month later
called the area "unexplored. "13 Dr:
K.O. Emery of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution has stated in a recent
monograph preparcd for the Department of Interior that knowledge gained
from exploration of the continental
shelf by the petroleum industry, which
began little more than 15 years ago, has
probably produced knowledge of the
shelf which exceeds the gains from all
other sources. Nevertheless, he points
out that even today, only the shelves
adjacent to the most industrialized
countries are at all well known. And
even .for these best known shelves, large
gaps m knowledge exist)4
Anothcr factor which should reduce
apprehension ahont ncgotilltion within
the United NlItions fn"llllework ill thl!
experience in connection with the Outer
Space Treaty. That experience would
tend to indicate that the U.S.S.R. and
the United States can, where their interests are parallel, resist the injection of
issues not ripe for international negotiation. The analysis in Chapter IV as well
as the preliminary debate in the First
Committee in the fall of 1967 indicate
that in this area the interests of the
United States and the Soviet Union
seem to be generally parallel.
Ouh!r Boundary of the Continental
Shelf. A suhstlllllilll initilll IIl'nefit which
could flow from negotiations within the
Ad Hoc Committee would be the de-
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wiol'lIll'nt of an inLl'rna!ional 1:()nSl'n~IIS
on an IInambil-(lIous ollLer bOllndary for
the continenlai shclf hcrore the trend
toward exclllsive coasLal sLate claims can
gather further momentum. Agreement
on this issue is fUlHiamenLal to any
settlement of the legal sLatus of the
deep ocean floor. Otherwise, the boundary betwecn the continental shelf and
the deep ocean hed would he a constant
source of uneerLainty and tension. [n
this connection, the Continental Shelf
Convention provides that it is open for
revision 5 years after it enLers into
force. Since it entered into force in
11)(l't,lS iL will be open for revision in
1'J()9. A number of commentaLors have
suggesLed the need for revision of the
boundary at that time.l 6
The mere fact that the Convention is
open for revision, however, docs not
mean that it can or will he revised. A
revision would require the development
of a consensus on a proper, fixed
IimiL--a task Lh,lt appears no closer to
accomplishment today than it was in
1958, when the Convention was negotiated aL· Geneva. There are, however,
two fae!ors Lodar which were not
present in 1958 ~nd would tend to
suggest a more favorable climate for
agreement. The first is that with the
prospect of more than token activities
ou the seabell wiLhin the foreseeable
future, there should hc a f:,'Tcater apprc·
ciation on the part of thc statcs that the
problem is a rcal one, involving important national and intcrnational interests,
and not just a discussion of abstractions.
Thc second is thc manner in which thc
prohlcm is bcing approached. The Ad
Hoc Committcc is not adopting a purely
"political" or "Icgal" approach to the
problem but has been directed to
examinc the seicntific, technical, economic, legal and other aspects of the
8l'abrd and ocean floor at.d to indieatc
pral'lil'~11 ml'ans !o promoh~ in!I'rnaLional l'oolll'ra!ion in !hl~ l'xplora!ioll,
l'llIlt'l'rva!ion mill IISl' of the 8cabcd allli
ocean floor.l 7 A hopeful sign for a

favorable OULeOIlIl" Il\I this m;pecL of Lhl'
problem was Lhe ,~(lll:;tructive naLure of
the dehate in the First Committcc.
Implicit in the remarks of almost all the
spokesmen was an apprcciation of the
danger of cxaggcratcd, cxclusivc claims
hy coastal statcs.l 8 Thc rcpresentativc
of Swcden suggested (and his views werc
shared hy several other governments)
that some measures should hc taken to
freeze the prcsent situation and to
prevent claims to the ocean bed until
thc dcliberations had resulted in some
conclusions.l 9
Final Remarks. The last year has seen
the first tentativc stcps by thc international community toward cstablishing
the basis for a framework of law to
govern the scabed and subsoil of the
decp ocean arcas, The effect of these
steps has been to narrow the options
open to thc Unitcd States, both as to
the character of an ultimate regimc
which it might seck to support its
national intercsts and as to the method
it might choose to reach that goal.
Although the U.S. Government might
havc wished that this issue had not bel'n
raised within thc Unitcd Nations quiLe
so soon, tlte cvents arc not wholly
unfavorablc to U.S. intercsts.
In l'rl'a!illl-( Lhl' :Id Hoe Cllllllnilll'!',
the Assemhly acted conservatively,
steering nway from a hroad attack
which might have Icd immediately to
the drafting of a seabcd treaty or to
vesting jurisdiction over the. seahed in
the United Nations, Instcad it directed
the Committec's activities toward the
fact-finding and study arcas, asking that
the results hc reported to the 23rd
General Assembly. Additionally, the
First Committee debate had the beneficial effect of again focusing the mcmbcrs' attcntion on thc advcrse effects
which would follow the unlimited extcnsion of national jurisdictions over
broad expanses of the sea bottom, If
this should serve as a dampcr on the
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11'1111,'111'), 1111 IIIl! parI (If slal.'s
lowanl exlellliing Iheir eonlinclltal :;hclf
hounllarics oUlward, L1ral resull alone
would he a worlhwhilc accomplishment.
Nevertheless, the General Assembly
aelion has crealed the need for timely
aelion on the part of the Uniled Stales
Government to develop a national posilion on the issues raised by Resolulion

illnpll'lIl

No. 2:340 (XXII) in order that it lIIay
seize the iniliative in the Ad Hoc Committee and wilhin the 23rd General
Assembly, to which the CommiLtee
must report. Unless it 1II0ves in a timely
manner, il may find iLself in a position
where it can only reael to what may be
wholly unacceptable proposals from
other states.
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